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Seventy-first session
Agenda item 118
The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 12 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Turkmenistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the Ashgabat Declaration of the high-level United Nations-Central Asia dialogue on implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia, which was held in Ashgabat on 13 June 2017 and was attended at the ministerial level by representatives from the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan (see annex).

I would be very grateful if you would kindly circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 118, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Aksoltan Ataeva
Permanent Representative

17-11964 (E) 190717

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Annex to the letter dated 12 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Turkmenistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Ashgabat Declaration

1. We, the representatives of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan, have convened at the ministerial level on the initiative of the United Nations Secretary-General and the Government of Turkmenistan on 13 June 2017, in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, for the "High-Level United Nations-Central Asia Dialogue on Implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia". The High-Level Dialogue reviewed the progress made and defined future strategic priorities for the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia, including the Joint Plan of Action, which was adopted in this city on 30 November 2011.

2. We strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and recognize that the prevention of terrorism is one of the most important components of ensuring national and regional security. We also affirm that terrorism should not be associated with any religion, nationality, culture, civilization or ethnic group.

3. We welcome the important role of the United Nations in international counter-terrorism efforts, as well as the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and Security Council with regard to countering terrorism.

4. We welcome the recent initiative of the Secretary-General to reform the United Nations counter-terrorism architecture by establishing a new Office of Counter-Terrorism, and we look forward to working closely with this new Office. We also recognize the valuable support of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Office and UNRCCA in the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action, as well as the expertise provided by other international, regional and subregional organizations operating in Central Asia. We also note with appreciation that this year marks the tenth anniversary of the establishment of UNRCCA.

5. We agree to further strengthen our cooperation and coordination with the United Nations and other relevant entities, with a view to ensuring the effective implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly with regard to countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism. While the primary responsibility to implement the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy remains with us as Member States of the United Nations, we appeal for increased engagement by our bilateral partners, as well as international and regional organizations in support of its implementation.

6. We note that Central Asia is the first region where comprehensive, integrated and balanced implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was started. To this end, we recognize with satisfaction the achievements of the first two phases of the joint UNCCT-UNRCCA project "Towards the Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action for the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia", which is funded by the European Union and Norway, and have agreed that on this very strong foundation, and as a way forward, we will continue to support a balanced implementation of the four pillars of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy through a third phase of this project.

7. We request for the continued support of the United Nations, in particular, through its Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, to further assist in the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action, by coordinating efforts, helping build capacity, and supporting a platform for regular exchanges of information on progress towards implementation.

8. We intend to exert all necessary efforts to counter new threats identified in the fifth review resolution of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, including the recommendations of the United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, through promoting dialogue and conflict prevention, addressing the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon, promoting youth engagement, skills development and employment facilitation, countering terrorist narrative and the misuse of information technology, as well as sharing of information and best practices.

9. We further call for greater coherence by partners, United Nations entities, as well as other regional and international organizations supporting our activities, including the use of the Matrix of Activities of regional and international organizations in supporting the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action in Central Asia, jointly prepared by CTITF and UNRCCA, to coordinate their work.

10. We also express our gratitude to the Government of Turkmenistan for their initiative and warm welcome in hosting the "High-Level United Nations-Central Asia Dialogue on Implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia" in Ashgabat.

11. Adopted on 13th of June 2017 by the participants of the "High-Level United Nations-Central Asia Dialogue on Implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia", in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan.

Ashgabat, 13 June 2017

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Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 6 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am transmitting to your attention the statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic on the provocation of the Azerbaijani side along the line of contact between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan on 4 July 2017 (see annex).

Following the armed aggression launched by Azerbaijan in April 2016, which claimed numerous lives, including among the civilian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, two meetings were held between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Vienna on 16 May 2016 and in Saint Petersburg on 20 June 2016, under the auspices of the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). To reduce the risk of further violence, it was agreed to finalize in the shortest possible time an OSCE investigative mechanism for ceasefire violations, to expand the existing Office of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and to increase the number of international observers.

By consistently rejecting the creation of an investigative mechanism for ceasefire violations and the deployment of an increased number of international observers on the line of contact, Azerbaijan unequivocally reveals its failure and lack of interest in the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In their statement of 18 May 2017, for example, the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group were explicit in identifying Azerbaijan as the party initiating the ceasefire violations.

As long as Azerbaijan rejects the implementation of the agreements reached in Vienna and Saint Petersburg and fails to adhere to its international commitments under the 1994 and 1995 trilateral ceasefire agreements between Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, the leadership of Azerbaijan bears full responsibility for all the human casualties, regardless of their nationality. Armenia grieves the loss of all lives and urges Azerbaijan to immediately halt its continuing ceasefire violations and provocations and to adhere strictly and without further delay to its commitments to strengthen the ceasefire regime and to create an atmosphere conducive for moving the peace process forward.

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I kindly request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 6 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the Information and Public Relations Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Artsakh

5 July 2017

In the evening of 4 July 2017, the Azerbaijani side committed yet another provocation, firing at the territory of the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh Republic). For the first time since the aggression in April 2016, the armed forces of Azerbaijan employed a TR-107 multiple rocket launcher system. The fire was launched from the positions located in close proximity to residential buildings in the village of Alkhanlu.

The Defence Army of Artsakh was forced to take countermeasures to suppress the fire activity of the Azerbaijani army. The incident provoked by the Azerbaijani side, unfortunately, led to casualties among the villagers.

Since the aggression in April 2016 up to now, we have repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that the Azerbaijani side, in violation of all the norms of international humanitarian law, does not disdain to use its civilian population as a human shield for shelling the territory of Artsakh.

The peaceful population on both sides of the border has long become a hostage to the Azerbaijani authorities' policy of constant escalation of tensions on the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan and of sabotaging the efforts of the mediators to restore the negotiation process.

The incident once again confirms the importance of the agreements reached at the summits of 16 May 2016 in Vienna and of 20 June 2016 in Saint Petersburg, aimed at the stabilization of the situation on the line of contact. The immediate implementation of these agreements, torpedoed by Azerbaijan, will allow for the prevention of the recurrence of such incidents in the future.

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Identical letters dated 12 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, and further to previous letters concerning the attacks by armed terrorist groups on oil and gas facilities and personnel in the Syrian Arab Republic, I would like to convey to you the following information:

- On 6 May 2017, armed terrorist groups fired two mortar shells at the Muhradah natural gas pressure reduction and metering station in Hama governorate, causing considerable damage to the station.
- On 25 May 2017, armed terrorist groups attacked the Zayzun gas station in Idlib governorate, stole mechanical equipment at the station and caused much destruction to other equipment.
- In the month of May 2017, armed terrorist groups attacked the shutoff valve station on the Arak-Aleppo gas line in the Dayr Hafir district of Aleppo governorate, destroying or stealing equipment.
- On 12 June 2017, armed terrorist groups used improvised explosive devices to attack the Arab gas pipeline in the Baytariyah district in Rif Dimashq governorate.

The attacks by armed terrorist groups have caused enormous material losses following the damage to oil and gas facilities and infrastructure, severely jeopardizing various aspects of life for Syrian citizens, due to interruptions and shortages of electricity and fuel and the associated negative consequences on the delivery of heating services and essential goods and services for daily life.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mounzer **Mounzer**
Minister Plenipotentiary
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Identical letters dated 12 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, and further to previous letters relating to the aerial bombardments carried out by aircraft of the so-called international coalition led by the United States of America on villages and areas populated by civilians and on oil and gas infrastructure and facilities in the Syrian Arab Republic, I wish to convey to you the following information:

- On 22 April 2017, aircraft of this illegitimate "international coalition" bombed a gas station in the north-central part of Tuwaynan district in Raqqah governorate.
- On 29 and 30 May 2017, aircraft of this illegitimate "international coalition" bombed gas wells in the Tabiyah district in Dayr al-Zawr governorate.
- On 27 May 2017, aircraft of this illegitimate coalition bombed the village of Hasu Albu Awf in the district of Shaddadah in Hasakah governorate, completely destroying many homes and killing civilians, most of them children. Of the victims, the following have been identified: Ayd Abdullah al-Husyan, Farhan Ayd al-Husayn and Amal al-Khidr, and children such as Muhammad Farhan al-Husayn, born in 2007, Sarah Farhan al-Husayn, born in 2009, Ibrahim Farhan al-Husayn, born in 2010, Zahrah Farhan al-Husayn, born in 2016, and Yusuf Fariq al-Husayn, born in 2016.

The repeated bombardments by this illegitimate "international coalition" continue to claim the lives of hundreds of innocent Syrian civilians and to cause significant material losses and the near-total destruction of Syrian facilities, homes and infrastructure, as well as the utter destruction of Syrian oil and gas facilities and sites. The attacks by the so-called international coalition, together with the illegal unilateral coercive economic measures imposed on the Syrian Arab Republic by the United States of America, the European Union and other States are impeding the maintenance of those economic facilities and jeopardizing the prospects for development and reconstruction in the Syrian Arab Republic.

My Government reaffirms its position that the attacks by the so-called international coalition against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant within the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic are illegal and violate the Charter of the United Nations and international law, inasmuch as they are being carried out without prior authorization from or coordination with the Syrian Government. My Government insists that these attacks must come to an end, and that the members of

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this illegitimate coalition must bear the political and legal responsibility for the destruction of infrastructure in the Syrian Arab Republic, including responsibility for compensation.

I should be grateful if this letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mounzer **Mounzer**
Minister Plenipotentiary
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2350 (2017), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for a final period of six months, until 15 October 2017; established the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) for an initial period of six months, from 16 October 2017 until 15 April 2018; and requested a report on the implementation of the resolution within 90 days. It covers major developments that have occurred since the issuance of my previous report, of 16 March 2017 (S/2017/223), and progress made on the closing-down of MINUSTAH and the establishment of MINUJUSTH.

II. Developments on the ground

A. Political

2. Haiti has continued to make strides in the consolidation of its democracy and stability. On 22 March, following Parliament's endorsement, the Prime Minister of Haiti, Jack Guy Lafontant, and his 18-member Cabinet of Ministers, which includes five women, assumed their functions. On 29 March, the President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, presented the new Cabinet with a road map for the Government focused on the security, justice, energy, education, health and agriculture sectors and based on decentralization as a strategy for transforming and modernizing the State to better meet the needs of the people and key national sectors.

3. On 29 March, the thirtieth anniversary of the 1987 Constitution, the Lower Chamber of Parliament launched a special commission, tasked with delivering a report on its assessment of the Constitution by January 2019. Shortly afterwards, on 10 April, the executive branch and the legislature adopted a joint legislative agenda comprising 51 draft laws aimed at improving the business climate, reinforcing State functions and ensuring better territorial planning, particularly with regard to the rehabilitation of the environment. The agenda includes a draft bill on the remobilization of the Haitian Armed Forces, which the executive branch and the legislature consider to be a priority in the context of the closure of MINUSTAH.

4. On 8 May, the final results of the 29 January 2017 local elections, announced by the Provisional Electoral Council, were published in the official gazette, with 9

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of the 570 communal sections requiring reruns because of a lack of registered candidates, violence or tied results. To complete the local governance structure envisaged in the Constitution, indirect elections are now required for the establishment of the municipal and departmental assemblies and the departmental and interdepartmental councils. On 29 June, the provisional electoral council announced the calendar for the indirect elections that will be held between 1 July and 26 September.

5. On 17 May, President Moïse completed his first 100 days in office. Among notable actions taken during that period was his flagship initiative, "Caravan of Change", consisting of monthly visits to the regions aimed at revitalizing the agricultural, environmental and transport sectors as set out in the government programme. On 15 May, as a first step to end government subsidies, fuel prices were increased following negotiations with trade unions. On 5 June, in the wake of protests by workers' unions demanding an increase in the minimum wage, the Government reconstituted the Superior Council of Salaries, which released for consideration its recommendations on a new minimum wage scale on 7 July.

6. On 6 June, at the request of President Moïse, Parliament convened an extraordinary session to amend the national budget for the fiscal year from October 2016 to September 2017, which was approved by the Government on 2 June. The generally conservative budget as adopted by Parliament provides 75.91 billion gourdes ($1.2 billion) for operations and 42.77 billion gourdes ($680 million) for investments, and is aimed at tightening central government spending, maintaining macroeconomic stability and limiting the fiscal deficit, currently estimated at 5.8 billion gourdes ($93.7 million) for the fiscal year 2016/17, to a sustainable level. Capital expenditures to boost growth remain limited, and subsidies to the State-owned electricity authority continue. Despite increased allocations for agriculture, the environment and education, investments in those growth-enhancing sectors remain low. The fragile socioeconomic situation continues to contribute to the increased vulnerability of Haitian households, particularly affecting girls and women, whose voices have been largely absent from the political processes relating to these issues. On 30 June, the executive branch submitted the draft budget for the fiscal year 2017/18 before the Lower Chamber, for a total amount of 144.2 billion gourdes ($2.3 billion), representing an increase of 22.1 per cent compared with the previous year.

7. Prior to the closing of the first ordinary session of the 2017 legislative year on 8 May, Parliament adopted a law strengthening the national fire department and ratified two international conventions on statelessness. Parliament also voted to amend the draft organic law on the financial intelligence unit strengthening measures against money-laundering and terrorism financing, thereby averting the risk of financial isolation by the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force.

B. Security

8. Growing tensions linked to socioeconomic grievances notwithstanding, key indicators, including crime and civil protests, remained within historically established statistical parameters. The ongoing withdrawal of the MINUSTAH military and police components, including the closure of military bases in the northern departments and Cité Soleil and the gradual transfer of security tasks to the Haitian National Police, has not affected the overall security situation.

9. Crime statistics collected by the national police and MINUSTAH for the period from 1 March to 30 June 2017 indicated a slight increase, with 356 reported homicides, compared with 345 during the same period in the previous year. Nearly

78 per cent of the homicides (278) remained concentrated in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. Seven national police officers were killed, compared with 10 officers killed during the same period in 2016. Kidnappings dropped to 9 cases, compared with 19 during the same period in 2016, as did instances of rape, with 188 cases, compared with 196. However, as highlighted in my previous report, evidence of underreporting and a culture of impunity remain pervasive, particularly in cases of sexual and gender-based violence.

10. A total of 288 public protests were recorded, of which 75 (26 per cent) registered some violence, ranging from erected barricades and stone-throwing to assaults against police officers and shootings. This represents a decrease compared with the 382 incidents, of which 117 (31 per cent) were violent, reported during the same period in 2016. The metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince registered 44 per cent of those incidents, followed by the remaining areas of the West Department (20 per cent). Of the 288 incidents, approximately 93 per cent involved fewer than 1,000 people, with no protests involving more than 3,000. The vast majority of these protests were triggered by socioeconomic grievances, related to education, health, labour and the cost of living, and damage caused by heavy rains.

11. On 7 April, an attack against the presidential motorcade was reported in Arcahaie (West Department). Although no casualties resulted from the attack, its precise circumstances have yet to be clarified by an ongoing national police investigation. The incident fuelled perceptions of increasing insecurity. On 13 May, the Secretary of State for Public Security, Jeantel Joseph, who is also the head of Senator-elect Guy Philippe's Consortium party, was replaced by Léon Ronsard Saint-Cyr, former Minister of the Interior and Local Governance. Guy Phillipe is currently facing a nine-year jail term in the United States of America for drug-smuggling and money-laundering.

12. The Mission's police component continued to provide operational support to the national police, conducting 2,624 joint temporary checkpoints, 2,825 foot patrols, 19,864 vehicle patrols and 296 joint operations, including 163 in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. Military troops carried out 4,046 operations, 163 of which were joint patrols with Haitian and MINUSTAH police officers.

C. Haitian National Police

13. The Haitian National Police continued to strengthen its capacities in providing security and ensuring law and order throughout the country. The twenty-seventh promotion, comprising 946 new police officers, including 80 women, graduated on 27 March, bringing the size of the force to approximately 14,000 police officers, of whom 1,301, or 9 per cent, are women. The police-to-population ratio reached 1.3 police officers per 1,000 inhabitants. The graduates were assigned primarily to reinforce specialized units and the Directorate of Prison Administration and were deployed to various departments to ensure prompt responses in crime-prone areas. On 21 May, the twenty-eighth promotion of 1,042 cadets, including 129 women, began training; the promotion is expected to graduate by December, which will bring the total strength of the Haitian National Police above the targeted number of 15,000 personnel. National police infrastructure remained a priority, with the completion of 13 new projects, funded by MINUSTAH quick-impact projects and bilateral contributors.

14. The draft Haitian National Police strategic development plan for the period 2017-2021 was completed with MINUSTAH support, following consultations with national and international stakeholders. The plan, which identifies long-term institution-building objectives, was presented to the President and the Prime

Minister on 28 June and was subsequently adopted by the Prime Minister in his capacity as President of the Superior Council of the National Police, on 5 July.

D. Rule of law and human rights

15. Limited progress was made during the reporting period in the performance of the judicial institutions and in the administration of justice, with key appointments to the Supreme Court pending action by Parliament and the executive branch. A strike called in April by the civil servants' union of the Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes paralysed its operations.

16. On a positive note, on 25 April the draft criminal code and the draft criminal procedure code were submitted to Parliament by the executive branch, while a committee submitted a draft law on legal aid to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security on 11 May. Some progress was noted in curbing prolonged pretrial detention through the establishment of a real-time case file management process in the court of first instance in Port-au-Prince, resulting in the closing of 126 cases. Through the penal chain committee, MINUSTAH helped to develop monthly case-tracking tools and performance indicators for investigating judges, which accelerated the completion of 257 pretrial investigations in Port-au-Prince and 139 in Cap-Haïtien, compared with 400 and 250, respectively, for all of 2016.

17. Prolonged pretrial detention and prison overcrowding remain serious human rights concerns. On 19 May, Haitian prisons counted 10,512 detainees, including 349 women and 240 male and 15 female juveniles; 71 per cent were awaiting trial, reflecting no decrease since the issuance of my previous report. The publication of the first report of the special presidential commission on prison conditions, established in February, was awaited, while deaths in detention had further increased to 115 as at 30 May, compared with the 113 reported for the full year 2016.

18. Under the joint interim rule of law programme of MINUSTAH and the United Nations Development Programme, a team of international experts reviewed a draft penitentiary law aimed at modernizing the management of the Directorate of Prison Administration. The Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes was also supported in its review of the organization and functioning of the Court, with a view to helping strengthen efforts to fight impunity and the misappropriation of public funds. As part of the transition to local actors, a forum was organized with the Haitian Chamber of Commerce and Industry to discuss the development of public-private partnerships with businesses to support the reinsertion of released detainees.

19. Community violence reduction activities, reaching 87,711 beneficiaries through 31 projects totalling $5 million, were ongoing, while 37 projects totalling $6.5 million that reached 53,766 beneficiaries were closing. Projects were focused on vocational training, labour-intensive infrastructure, sexual and gender-based violence, legal aid and related issues.

20. MINUSTAH continued to advocate more systematic investigations into the use of force and firearms by national police officers. Civil society organizations, including the International Federation for Human Rights, called upon the Government to prioritize the fight against impunity for serious crimes committed in the past, insisting that the trial for crimes committed under the late President Jean-Claude Duvalier take place, after years of judicial inaction following the decision handed down by an appellate court in February 2014. If enacted, a draft law against defamation, voted on by the Senate in March and awaiting adoption by the Lower

Chamber, could jeopardize freedom of expression, in contravention of the international obligations of Haiti.

21. The mandate of the Independent Expert of the Human Rights Council on the situation of human rights in Haiti expired in March 2017 and was not renewed by the Council. Despite repeated calls from my Special Representative, the Independent Expert and civil society organizations, the Government has yet to assign the human rights portfolio to a specific ministry. The term of the Ombudsperson, the State's independent human rights defender, ended in September 2016, with no replacement appointed to date, despite some progress in the recruitment process since its launch in February 2017. MINUSTAH released its annual report on the human rights situation in Haiti on 3 July 2017, covering the period from 1 July 2015 to 31 December 2016. The report highlighted a high number of arbitrary arrests, cruel and inhumane treatment in detention facilities and a lack of accountability that emboldens impunity.

E. Humanitarian and development

22. In March, a mission of the Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Emergency Director Group reviewed the effectiveness of the humanitarian response in Haiti. The mission made recommendations to the humanitarian country team and the Government on how to improve the effectiveness of the humanitarian architecture in place, enhance coordination between humanitarian and development actors and develop a more strategic approach to protection. As at 19 May, 2.35 million people in Haiti were severely food-insecure and in need of immediate assistance, while more than 143,110 were estimated to be suffering from acute malnutrition. Since Hurricane Matthew struck in October 2016, 1,273 households, or 4,200 people, have remained housed in temporary shelters. The humanitarian community is engaging the Government to develop a strategy for assisting the affected people in leaving those shelters in a safe and voluntary manner. In the most affected departments, Grand' Anse, Nippes and South, low funding levels have impeded the scaling-up of the humanitarian response to food, shelter, health and protection needs. With crop losses reaching 80 to 100 per cent in rural areas, food insecurity stands to increase in the coming months if urgent measures are not taken to resume farming by mid-November.

23. As at 31 May 2017, the International Organization for Migration had registered 192,685 people who had returned from the Dominican Republic since June 2015. Those arriving in Haiti continue to find themselves in a situation of vulnerability owing to the insufficient reception capacity of the Haitian authorities and a lack of reintegration opportunities. This group will likely continue to need assistance in the foreseeable future, including with regard to the determination of their legal status. Coordination between the United Nations country teams in Haiti and the Dominican Republic has allowed for effective responses to the needs of affected people as well as for preparedness and contingency planning. Since the 2010 earthquake, 46,691 persons have remained internally displaced in 31 camps without access to durable solutions.

24. As at 10 June 2017, 7,113 suspected cases of cholera and 83 related deaths had been reported, in comparison with the 18,486 suspected cases and 173 deaths reported for the same period in 2016. As indicated in my second report on the new approach to cholera in Haiti (A/71/895), the intensified cholera response carried out by rapid-deployment mobile teams, including a vaccination campaign benefiting more than 800,000 persons, mostly in hurricane-affected areas, has resulted in a significant decline in the number of suspected cholera cases. Securing the necessary

funding for the ongoing efforts of the Government and its international partners to contain and eradicate cholera will be critical to sustaining the positive progress made so far in 2017.

25. During the reporting period, more than 86,000 individuals living with HIV, 62 per cent of them women, received antiretroviral medication. With United Nations support, the Ministry of Health conducted a nationwide poll in support of eliminating stigma and discrimination relating to HIV and continued its efforts to eliminate mother-to-child transmission of the virus by 2020.

26. Low international oil prices constrained concessional financing through the Petrocaribe agreement, while public investment contracted by 20 per cent and private investment remained slow. As a result of recent interventions in the foreign exchange market by the central bank of Haiti and an increase in remittances, the Haitian gourde appreciated, rising in value from 70 to 63.7 against 1 United States dollar, during the first quarter of 2017. Measures announced at the beginning of the fiscal year, aimed at bolstering the capacity of the State institutions to apply its tax policy and boost revenue, were not fully implemented. The poor financial performance of the State-owned electricity authority and the delayed decision to implement the automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism continued to constrain the narrow public resource envelope. The fiscal deficit, however, is expected to be approximately 2.5 per cent of gross domestic product by the end of the current fiscal year, down from the 5 per cent initially projected, owing to lower spending related to post-hurricane recovery and reconstruction efforts.

27. In May, the annual visit of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti of the Economic and Social Council examined ways to strengthen the partnership between the Government and the international community in support of the country's economic recovery and development. The United Nations country team met with the Government and civil society representatives to validate the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for the period 2017-2021 before its signature on 30 June 2017. Discussions with the Prime Minister on United Nations support for the Government's development priorities are ongoing, following a meeting held on 2 May with the country team.

28. As at 22 May, MINUSTAH had disbursed $2,994,873.54 of the $3 million quick-impact project budget for the fiscal year 2016/17, implementing 57 of 60 planned projects, which benefited 2,000,569 people, including 1,040,296 women. Projects were focused primarily on the rule of law, good governance, public infrastructure and the provision of potable water to prevent water-borne diseases, including cholera.

III. Transition of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

A. Mission drawdown planning

29. Pursuant to resolution 2350 (2017), MINUSTAH began the implementation of a comprehensive withdrawal plan encompassing its military, police and civilian components, with the objective of fully withdrawing 2,370 troops and reducing the police component to the levels authorized for MINUJUSTH, while significantly reducing its geographical and staffing footprint, before its closure on 15 October. Throughout the drawdown process, my Special Representative and other members of the MINUSTAH leadership team have consulted with the Government at all levels, including the President and the Prime Minister, to ensure the progressive transfer of tasks to the Haitian authorities, where appropriate.

1. Military component

30. Following the adoption of resolution 2350 (2017), MINUSTAH began to implement the first phase of a staggered military drawdown. Accordingly, on 15 April the Chilean aviation unit and the Chilean and joint Uruguayan-Peruvian battalions ceased operations in the northern part of Haiti, with Brazilian troops providing security for the vacated camps. Certain key tasks, including security analysis and patrols in sensitive areas, were gradually transferred to the national police with the support of MINUSTAH police. On 15 June, the military component completed the handover to the national police of security tasks in the fragile commune of Cité Soleil in Port-au-Prince, in close coordination with the MINUSTAH police component. Before the handover, the three forces had doubled their joint patrols in the area.

31. The next phase saw the ceasing of operations of the Guatemalan company on 10 June, while the Philippine company will cease operations on 15 July. The full repatriation of the two companies is planned for July and August, respectively. Between 15 April and 30 June, the military component's engineering units prepared 9 of the 65 MINUSTAH camps for closure and handover to the Government and private property owners.

32. By 10 July, MINUSTAH had withdrawn a total of 956 military personnel, reducing the strength of the component to 1,413 personnel, who are concentrated in Port-au-Prince. The remaining troops, comprising one infantry battalion, two engineering companies, medical and aviation units and a force headquarters, will focus primarily on camp closures while continuing long-range patrols and quick-reaction force exercises throughout the country, if needed. The final withdrawal of the military component will start on 15 August with the ceasing of operations of the Argentinian military hospital, followed by the ceasing of operations, on 1 September, of the Brazilian contingents, the Paraguayan engineering company and the Bangladeshi aviation unit. The force headquarters will remain operational after the repatriation of the last troops, which is planned for 1 to 5 October, until the last day of the MINUSTAH mandate.

2. Police component

33. MINUSTAH leadership consulted closely with the Government and high-level commanding officers of the national police to ensure that adequate security arrangements were being put in place, in particular in those geographical and functional areas from which the Mission's troops and police are withdrawing. New arrangements include strategic planning for the deployment of newly graduated officers of the twenty-seventh promotion of the Haitian National Police and its crowd control units in crime-prone and volatile regions of the country.

34. Taking into account the key objectives of the Haitian National Police strategic development plan for the period 2017-2021, MINUSTAH undertook a mapping exercise, identifying areas from which the United Nations police will disengage, which will require an active role on the part of the national police and continued support from international partners, including the United Nations country team. One such role is currently being piloted in the North region, namely, a co-location model in which individual MINUSTAH police officers work together with their national police counterparts at a senior level, providing hands-on operational support and mentoring guidance, directly transferring skills and capacities aimed at ensuring longer-term sustainability. A lessons-learned exercise to be undertaken jointly with the national police to further calibrate the approach on the basis of early results will permit the model to be applied at 17 regional offices and in Port-au-Prince under MINUJUSTH.

35. As the reduction from 11 to 7 formed police units and from 951 to 295 individual police officers began, MINUSTAH repatriated 1 Bangladeshi formed police unit comprising 125 elements and 116 individual police officers during the reporting period, reducing the strength of the component to 1,527 formed police unit personnel and 635 individual police officers. In addition, 19 of the 43 police co-location sites were closed. The remaining 474 formed police unit personnel, belonging to the three Pakistani, one Jordanian and three Indian units, will be repatriated in mid-August, while the remaining 340 individual police officers will be separated between July and October.

3. Civilian component

36. On the basis of the identified critical functions and minimum capacity required for focused mandate delivery during the drawdown of MINUSTAH, a monthly civilian drawdown plan was developed. The plan safeguards core mandated areas that will be retained as part of the focus of MINUJUSTH on good offices, the rule of law, human rights and support for police development, and adequate mission support capacities to facilitate the closure and liquidation of MINUSTAH. On 30 June, 317 of 1,346 posts were separated from MINUSTAH. Further reductions in civilian staff will be effected on a monthly basis from July through September, at which point 614 staff will remain before being separated by 15 October.

37. The Mission's geographical footprint was significantly reduced with the ceasing of operations of the regional offices in Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes on 30 June and the related ceasing of civilian functions at the departmental level. Furthermore, 26 of the Mission's 65 sites scheduled for closure, including 4 military and police camps and 19 police co-locations, were closed. All sites are being closed in compliance with United Nations environmental management guidance. In keeping with internal rules and regulations, an asset disposal plan has been developed, classifying MINUSTAH assets into five disposal categories, including redeployment to other missions, sale to the United Nations country team or donation in support of the rehabilitation of the country.

38. MINUSTAH is supporting national staff in their search for employment following their separation from the Mission, including through the organization of a job fair on 28 June, engaging private and public sector actors, diplomatic missions and international organizations, and the holding of targeted capacity-building workshops, for example, on entrepreneurship.

B. Joint transition plan of the United Nations Mission Stabilization Mission in Haiti and the United Nations country team

39. In parallel to the Mission's drawdown, MINUSTAH and the United Nations country team finalized and adopted a joint transition plan. Guided by resolution 2350 (2017), and on the basis of an institutional capacity assessment, a risk analysis and the work carried out under the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, the transition plan is the result of a comprehensive planning process that began in 2014/15 through the establishment of joint thematic groups in which MINUSTAH and the country team identified common objectives in the areas of the rule of law, police development, human rights, gender and governance. The plan identifies stabilization needs and priority objectives for Haiti and, accordingly, areas for continued United Nations engagement as well as areas from which MINUSTAH is disengaging. It describes critical peacebuilding gaps that will result from the withdrawal of MINUSTAH and that will require continued support from MINUJUSTH as well as the country team and the donor community.

40. Activities from which peacekeeping in Haiti has initiated its progressive disengagement include: subnational governance, including support for decentralized bodies and local government; operational electoral support; border management; legislative drafting and capacity-building; the training of national authorities on child protection issues; juvenile justice; and policing areas, such as traffic control, maritime patrolling, anti-kidnapping efforts, vetting activities, civil protection and close protection. Strong government leadership and increased support from international partners, including the United Nations country team, will be vital to preserving the progress made thus far in these areas.

41. The plan also includes a public communications strategy that was continuously implemented throughout the reporting period, with strategic media engagement and outreach undertaken by my Special Representative and the senior leadership of the Mission and the United Nations country team. Raising awareness regarding the closure of MINUSTAH and the transition to a new configuration of the United Nations presence in Haiti, namely, MINUJUSTH and the United Nations country team, will remain critical in the next reporting period.

IV. Planning for the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti

A. Overview and strategic objectives

42. Planning for the establishment of MINUJUSTH, in line with the mandate parameters set out in resolution 2350 (2017), is well under way, under the auspices of a Haiti planning team based in New York. The planning team will continue to fulfil its role of MINUJUSTH advance team, envisaged in the resolution, until the first appointments of MINUJUSTH leadership have been made. Among the several assessment visits to Haiti that have been carried out since the adoption of the resolution, which have targeted various aspects of planning, the United Nations Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and Other Crisis Situations team visited Haiti from 8 to 22 May to help develop the priorities and objectives of MINUJUSTH and the country team in the area of the rule of law and to contribute to the development of a strategy for supporting the transition to development actors. The Global Focal Point assessment took place in close cooperation with the Government of Haiti, which designated three senior officials to co-lead, from the Haitian National Police, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Directorate of Prison Administration.

43. The link between chronic stability challenges, on the one hand, and challenges in the rule of law and human rights, on the other, as identified by the strategic assessment mission in February and the Global Focal Point visit in May, has provided the main premise for MINUJUSTH planning in the three key areas of its mandate: justice and corrections, police development and human rights. Building on the achievements of MINUSTAH, MINUJUSTH will seek to address residual deficiencies in the judicial and corrections systems, which continue to suffer from chronic politicization, lack of accountability, limited access to justice for citizens and high rates of prolonged pretrial detention, and which feed into the public perception that violence and corruption are more effective means of addressing grievances than the law. MINUJUSTH will focus on further strengthening the operational and administrative capacity of the Haitian National Police and its compliance with international human rights standards, particularly with respect to the use of force and arrest and detention, so that it can gradually, and autonomously, assume responsibility for the provision of security and the effective protection of the population throughout the country, including from sexual and gender-based

violence. MINUJUSTH will also seek to strengthen the capacity of civil society and national institutions mandated to independently monitor human rights violations, and will further advocate against impunity so that those oversight institutions will play a more effective role of watchdog with respect to the Constitution.

44. Mindful of a two-year mandate horizon, MINUJUSTH will target and prioritize its interventions within two broad strategic objectives: improving the accountability and human rights compliance of relevant institutions and improving their professionalism and efficiency. In that regard, appropriate benchmarks, based on a realistic assessment of MINUJUSTH achievements expected by the end of 2019, will be presented in my initial report to the Security Council following the entry into force of the Mission's mandate. Another key strategic objective of MINUJUSTH will be to support the maintenance of a safe and secure environment through continued operational support for the Haitian National Police following the withdrawal of the MINUSTAH military component. Furthermore, a strategy for gradually transferring MINUJUSTH functions to local institutions, where appropriate, and building the capacities and resources of the United Nations country team for supporting residual rule of law and human rights needs in the country will form an integral part of all MINUJUSTH areas of intervention, supporting the Mission's exit strategy. The development of a new, joint programme between MINUJUSTH and the country team, anchored in national plans, will offer a longer-term vision and a vehicle for closer cooperation and transition, as well as a means for resource mobilization in areas of increasing engagement by non-peacekeeping partners.

45. As an overall outcome, by the end of its mandate MINUJUSTH will seek to significantly improve the trust of all sectors of society in the rule of law and in the institutional checks and balances of democracy so that they can be broadly supported by all Haitians as important factors for longer-term stability and economic development. It is also expected that, by the end of 2019, MINUJUSTH will have ensured the seamless transition of residual peacebuilding tasks in the areas of the rule of law and human rights to the country team and other bilateral partners, as part of a longer-term United Nations commitment to sustaining peace and promoting development in the country.

B. Operations

46. In accordance with its mandate, MINUJUSTH will support and strengthen the accountability and oversight mechanisms in the justice sector, the Superior Council of the Judiciary and the Inspection Unit of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, so that those bodies can more effectively carry out their primary functions, namely, providing recommendations for the appointment and extension of judges and prosecutors, as well as holding such officials to account for poor performance, misconduct or human rights violations. MINUJUSTH will also advocate the completion of key legislative reform processes, especially those underpinning the functioning of the criminal justice system (the penal and criminal procedure codes, the law on legal aid and the prison law), strengthening institutional functioning (the review of the electoral legal framework) and promoting gender equality and action against sexual and gender-based violence (the gender equality bill and the law on the prevention, punishment and eradication of violence against women). In improving the concept of model jurisdictions implemented by MINUSTAH, MINUJUSTH will provide dedicated capacity-building and advisory support for the effective functioning of the police, criminal defence and justice and corrections institutions in one selected jurisdiction, with particular emphasis placed on improving Haitian ownership. It is hoped that successful results in that jurisdiction

will serve as a catalyst for improvement in other jurisdictions throughout Haiti, targeting a significant decrease in the percentage of criminal suspects held in pretrial detention for more than two years, as well as in the number of suspects held in police holding cells for more than 48 hours, contrary to Haitian law.

47. Corrections experts of MINUJUSTH, including government-provided personnel, will mentor and transfer expertise to senior-level officers of the Directorate of Prison Administration by supporting the certification by the latter of 9 of the 19 prisons in Haiti as capable of operating without full-time MINUJUSTH or other international support. MINUJUSTH will provide targeted support for the implementation of the Directorate's strategic development plan for the period 2017-2021 in terms of organizational development; the security and improvement of detention conditions; gender-responsive administration and management; and the rehabilitation and reintegration of inmates, including the strengthening of its autonomy in the management of its budget. MINUJUSTH will also support the Directorate, in coordination with Haitian National Police leadership, in developing and implementing a targeted recruitment and training road map aimed at increasing the number of its personnel from the current 1,649 to 2,349, including 33 per cent women, by 2021.

48. The human rights component of MINUJUSTH, in addition to cooperating with other components in strengthening the national accountability structures in the rule of law sector, will focus on strengthening the capacity of the national human rights institution, the Ombudsperson's office (the Office of Citizen Protection), in operating as a reliable human rights accountability mechanism vis-a-vis all State institutions. It will support the Ombudsperson in effectively and independently investigating systematic human rights violations and carrying out public reporting functions, in order to promote and protect the rights of all Haitian citizens, including women's rights, non-discrimination and equality. MINUJUSTH will provide technical assistance and support for the capacity of civil society with regard to advocacy and reporting to human rights mechanisms, while also supporting the adoption of a plan of action for the Government's implementation of the recommendations of such mechanisms, including those relating to impunity of past administrations.

49. MINUJUSTH will maintain a focus on the institutional and professional development of the Haitian National Police, within the framework of the Haitian National Police strategic development plan for the period 2017-2021. Focusing on a number of key priorities, the Mission will provide professional expertise to senior and midlevel management of the national police, through supervisory mentoring and strategic advice on leadership, investigation skills, gender mainstreaming and efforts to address sexual and gender-based violence. Mentoring and assistance will also be provided by civilian experts with specialized profiles to build capacities in police administration, in particular in the areas of reform and restructuring, planning, human resources, information and facilities management, transport, logistics, engineering, telecommunications, and budget and finance. Additional activities will target the development and implementation of community-oriented policing strategies to enable the national police to build greater trust with local communities, and training programmes to help prevent illegal or arbitrary arrest and detention and excessive use of force. Furthermore, MINUJUSTH will promote the effectiveness of the accountability mechanism of the Haitian National Police, its General Inspectorate, with a view to extending its authority beyond Port-au-Prince, as well as swift action to address human rights violations and misconduct cases when disciplinary or other judicial measures need to be applied.

50. The seven formed police units remaining in MINUJUSTH will provide continued operational support to the Haitian National Police in the maintenance of

law and order throughout the country, including for the protection of civilians, within the limits of their capabilities. Such support will be essential in areas outside the capital, where the presence of the national police remains weak, and MINUJUSTH will maintain the capacity to provide it rapidly. The formed police units will conduct joint field patrols with the Haitian National Police to help increase its visibility, both as a deterrent to crime and to build greater confidence in it on the part of the population. Joint patrols and operations are also expected to serve as a means to increase the "on-the-job" skills of national police officers in protecting civilians against threats of physical violence. The provision of operational support to the national police will be aimed at a gradual transition of full responsibility for security tasks to them, harmonized with their gradual build-up, and at ensuring the sustainability of security gains in the country.

51. MINUJUSTH will implement tailored community violence reduction projects to foster local engagement in the rule of law and the work of the Haitian National Police. Such projects will be focused on rule of law issues, ranging from corrections to policing and judicial matters, and supporting community outreach and dialogue through sensitization campaigns, including town halls, debates and workshops, in fragile areas throughout Haiti These community-based projects will to help raise awareness of key reform initiatives and ensure that local needs and concerns relating to security and socioeconomic issues are at the forefront of political discussions.

52. A United Nations electoral needs assessment mission, deployed to Haiti from 29 May to 2 June, provided recommendations on the holding of elections and proposed possible future United Nations support in that regard. The needs assessment mission observed that it was essential that United Nations electoral assistance be continued, in a manner aligned with the current transition context, in order to sustain and build on the results of the more than 13 years of such support provided in Haiti by MINUSTAH. The mission recommended that MINUJUSTH continue to support electoral institutional reform within its rule of law and good offices mandate, aimed at the establishment of the Permanent Electoral Council and the completion of the electoral legal framework. The next two years, during which no electoral events are expected to be held, represent a unique window of opportunity for addressing these key matters. Under current transition planning, future technical support for electoral processes is to be provided by the United Nations country team.

C. Political strategy

53. Lessons learned from the work carried out by MINUSTAH on the rule of law over the past 13 years have highlighted the need for close links between the political strategies of the United Nations and its support for rule of law reform, in order to promote results. In that context, and in the light of the recommendation of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations regarding the primacy of politics in peacekeeping, the political and operational strategies of the Mission form a close nexus with its political and good offices mandate and efforts, in direct support of its rule of law and human rights mandate. To that end, the substantive structure of the Mission will also be centred on a joint political and rule of law pillar, working closely with both the police and human rights pillars, thus ensuring an adequate level of synergy and common strategic intent and maximizing the impact of a relatively light footprint.

54. In pursuing those and other strategic objectives, MINUJUSTH, through its political leadership, will employ its good offices role vis-à-vis the executive and legislative branches. In order to extend its political leverage beyond the capital, the

Mission will play an early warning and monitoring role, together with a political outreach and advocacy role, vis-à-vis key sectors of the society and local decision makers at the regional level. This will be achieved through the mobile deployment of joint political, justice, corrections and human rights experts to the nine regions outside Port-au-Prince on a weekly basis and will make use of the coordinated community violence reduction outreach and sensitization programme.

55. The success of MINUJUSTH will depend in large part on its ability to quickly develop a relationship of partnership, mutual understanding and cooperation with the Government on priority challenges that need to be addressed in the country. The planning for MINUJUSTH so far reflects a shared vision with key government stakeholders in the areas of its mandate. However, continuous engagement will be sought by the leadership of both MINUSTAH and MINUJUSTH in order to ensure further refinement of those priorities in the coming months and a continuous commitment on the part of the Government to supporting the implementation of such priorities in the future. In that regard, it will be for my Special Representative for MINUJUSTH, once appointed, to pursue discussions with the Government on a possible cooperation framework, based on mutual priorities and mutual accountability, which should also be closely linked to the identification of benchmarks for the fulfilment of the Mission's mandate.

D. Footprint and support issues

56. MINUJUSTH will have a considerably lighter footprint than MINUSTAH, with a reduction of more than 75 per cent in civilian staffing levels. All civilian components, including substantive, support and security, will be based in Port-au-Prince and equipped with the mobility necessary to address needs in the regions. In accordance with the human resources strategy for international civilian staff to be selected from rosters and a similar competitive process for national civilian staff, recruitment for MINUJUSTH is being carried out in three stages, with the first already in progress, targeting leadership posts.

57. The police component of MINUJUSTH will be ready and operational on 16 October 2017, through the drawdown and reconfiguration of the MINUSTAH police component, which are already under way. The 295 individual police officers and an additional number of contracted civilian police experts will be co-located at 17 Haitian National Police facilities in the capital and at all 10 of the regional administrative headquarters of the national police. Of the seven formed police units, including one with an embedded special weapons and tactics (SWAT) capacity, three will be based in Port-au-Prince (the West region) and the other four in the Nord, Artibonite, Nippes and Grand' Anse regions.

58. The concept of operations for MINUJUSTH police implies the need for air and ground mobility so that formed police units and SWAT personnel can rapidly deploy from their five locations to support Haitian National Police operations and protect civilians throughout Haiti, including United Nations personnel and assets. A procurement process initiated in May for the deployment of two commercial helicopters will prevent a gap in air capacity following the departure of MINUSTAH military air assets in mid-August. While the option of retaining these commercial helicopters in MINUJUSTH remains, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is also approaching Member States with a request for police helicopters, which are not limited in the transportation of certain types of crowd control equipment for use in emergency situations.

59. The Department of Safety and Security is working with the designated official and the United Nations country team to reconfigure the United Nations security

management system structure in Haiti. Given the reduced number of locations and uniformed elements countrywide, a more centralized approach is being designed. In that regard, enhanced host country security support is being sought to facilitate United Nations activity across Haiti, particularly in areas and regions where the rapid deployment of MINUJUSTH formed police units to provide protection for United Nations staff may face logistical challenges.

V. Conduct and discipline

60. MINUSTAH strengthened the task force on protection from sexual exploitation and abuse through the development of a communications strategy with the United Nations country team and non-governmental organizations to advise the public on United Nations standards of conduct. It has also increased coordination with partners to identify available resources for the provision of assistance to victims of misconduct, and has been meeting with the local population to inform them of complaint reporting procedures and measures to protect victims, witnesses and family members.

VI. Financial aspects

61. The General Assembly, by its resolution 71/302, authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the maintenance of the Mission in a total amount not exceeding $90 million for the period from 1 July 2017 to 31 December 2017.

62. As at 6 July 2017, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINUSTAH amounted to $56.7 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $1,462.6 million.

63. Reimbursement of troop and formed police costs has been made for the period up to 30 April 2017, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 31 March 2017, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

VII. Observations

64. With the installation of the Government and of nearly all directly elected officials at all levels of the governance system of Haiti, and the completion of the first 100 days of the new administration, the country appears to be on a steady path towards institutional and political stability. I am encouraged by the adoption of a government road map that places emphasis on accountability and transparency while at the same time fighting against corruption. I also welcome the adoption of a joint legislative agenda by the executive branch and the legislature. This sets the stage for strengthened and constructive collaboration between those two branches of power, which is necessary for the implementation of an ambitious reform agenda, as outlined by President Moïse.

65. The launch of a special parliamentary commission to assess the Constitution could provide the framework for efforts to promote further progress in the country. I reiterate my encouragement to President Moïse to move forward with the broad-based national dialogue, which he announced earlier this year with the objective of forging a common vision based on reform priorities that address the most pressing socioeconomic and political challenges. I also encourage the inclusion of electoral reform in this agenda, with a view to further strengthening the national capacity to

administer and manage elections in Haiti without resorting to international assistance.

66. For the further consolidation of the democracy and continued development of Haiti, it is now essential that the independence of the judiciary, the third branch of government, be fully restored and assured. I therefore call on the relevant national authorities to take swift steps to fill key positions in the judiciary through a transparent and merit-based selection process. I also call attention to the continued need for measures to reduce women's vulnerability and guarantee their meaningful participation in decision-making. In addition, I welcome the Government's continued prioritization of the institutional development of the national police, which should be accompanied by the provision of adequate financial resources and the implementation of the newly articulated Haitian National Police strategic development plan for the period 2017-2021.

67. Tangible progress in the area of the rule of law is critical for the creation of conditions conducive to private investments, which can help to reverse the downward economic trends. It is important that all actors, including the State, political parties, the private sector and civil society, help to address social tensions and work together to deliver socioeconomic progress that responds to the expectations of the Haitian people.

68. While I note that the mandate of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti was not extended, I welcome the continued engagement by Haiti with other international mechanisms, such as treaty bodies and thematic special procedures. I encourage the Government, the national human rights institution and civil society to continue to engage with the human rights component of MINUJUSTH to strengthen the promotion and protection of human rights in Haiti.

69. I am encouraged by the reduction in the number of cholera cases and deaths reported, despite the impact of Hurricane Matthew in 2016, which could have had devastating consequences. It is essential that our joint efforts with the Government of Haiti to curb and contain the epidemic be sustained and that adequate funding be secured. To that end, I have appointed Josette Sheeran of the United States as my Special Envoy for Haiti to guide the full implementation of the new United Nations approach to cholera in Haiti and support national efforts to implement the 2030 sustainable development goals of Haiti.

70. MINUSTAH, while implementing a gradual drawdown, has remained equally focused on implementing critical aspects of its mandate during its last months. I commend all staff of the Mission, international and national, who are working in a committed manner for the successful implementation of its priorities, including through a responsible transition, until the last days of the mandate. I am also pleased that the security transition, through a gradual drawdown of the police component and the departure of MINUSTAH military units, has so far proceeded in a smooth manner, reinforcing indications that Haiti is ready to address challenges to its stable, yet fragile, security environment without a military presence. Such progress notwithstanding, the seven formed police units that will remain in MINUJUSTH will be prepared to provide operational support to the Haitian National Police until it reaches a number of key additional milestones in its institutional development.

71. Planning for MINUJUSTH reflects the two-year horizon for the completion of the peacekeeping phase of the United Nations engagement in Haiti, envisaged in resolution 2350 (2017). Accordingly, it sets targeted but realistic objectives for MINUJUSTH in its role in strengthening the rule of law, the police and human rights in Haiti, given the link between weaknesses in those areas and the recurrence of instability in the country throughout the years. At the same time, it reflects a

strategy of incremental transition, so that the country team gradually takes up residual peacebuilding tasks and local actors gradually assume full responsibility in areas from which peacekeeping will disengage, in continuation of the MINUSTAH-United Nations country team transition strategy. This will require that the bilateral partners of Haiti also step up and optimize their support, in order to ensure that no resource or capacity gaps are left unaddressed in the process of implementing that transition.

72. MINUJUSTH will seek to maximize its political leverage and good offices role, in order to increase the effectiveness of its targeted interventions in the areas of justice, police, corrections and human rights. It is hoped that this new approach, of closely linking technical expertise with political engagement, will create the political space necessary for reforms in areas where political interests have delayed progress throughout the MINUSTAH mandate. MINUJUSTH operations are also being designed to ensure maximum synergies between different substantive areas, cutting across different mission components, aimed at the implementation of a holistic strategic vision.

73. In the light of the advanced level of planning already undertaken to establish the new mission, I am confident that MINUJUSTH will be operational on 16 October 2017, the first day of its mandate. In the meantime, the United Nations will continue to engage with Haitian stakeholders and other partners in further developing and refining the concept of the Mission and ensuring appropriate synergies and alignment of efforts. I therefore invite the Haitian stakeholders to strengthen their engagement with the MINUSTAH leadership and the MINUJUSTH advance team in order to consolidate a joint vision on the priorities and objectives of the Mission and the wider United Nations presence, especially on rule of law reform, as well as a joint road map for their implementation. The reform agenda of Haiti can be achieved only when committed Haitian counterparts own it and take the necessary steps to effect change.

74. In the same vein, I welcome the support provided by the Security Council during its recent visit to Haiti, from 22 to 24 June, which underscored the high level of international commitment to Haiti, its Government and its people, and also demonstrated the continued United Nations engagement in the country's stability, development and institutional strengthening in the areas of the rule of law and human rights. The visit also provided an opportunity for government counterparts and civil society and private sector interlocutors to express their concerns and expectations with respect to the reconfiguration of the United Nations presence and the transition to MINUJUSTH.

75. In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude to my Special Representative for Haiti, Sandra Honoré, for her invaluable contributions to the stability of Haiti, as well as to all remaining and departing MINUSTAH civilian staff and uniformed personnel, for their unwavering commitment to achieving the Mission's mandate. I am equally grateful to the United Nations country team and other partners, who are continuing their close cooperation with MINUSTAH as it draws down and are preparing to step up their role in the next phase of United Nations engagement in the country.

Annex I

Composition and strength of the police of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti as at 16 June 2017

	United Nations police officers		*Formed police units*	
Country	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*
Argentina		9		
Bangladesh	1	18	81	218
Benin		32		
Brazil		2		
Burkina Faso	1	25		
Cameroon	9	5		
Canada	8	50		
Chad		2		
Chile		2		
Colombia	7	30		
Djibouti		5		
El Salvador	2	25		
Ethiopia		8		
France		1		
Germany	1	2		
Ghana	1	9		
Guinea		4		
India		12		440
Indonesia	5	8		
Jordan		33		318
Madagascar	5	31		
Mali	2	36		
Nepal		17	13	127
Niger	9	69		
Nigeria	1	2		
Norway	3	3		
Pakistan				140
Philippines	1	11		
Portugal		1		
Romania	1	13		
Russian Federation	1	8		
Rwanda	1	9	21	139
Senegal		14	14	143
Slovakia	1	5		
Sweden	5	5		
Serbia		4		
Togo	21	9		
Tunisia		11		

	United Nations police officers		*Formed police units*	
Country	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*
Turkey		17		
United States of America	2	13		
Uruguay		4		
Yemen		2		
	88	566	129	1 525
Total		**654**		**1 654**
				2 308

Annex II

Countries providing military staff and contingents to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti as at 28 June 2017

	Staff officers		*Troops*		
Country	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Total*
Argentina		6	25	41	72
Bangladesh		2	2	108	112
Brazil[a]		9	19	951	979
Canada	1	5			6
Chile		3	4	50	57
Ecuador		1			1
El Salvador				1	1
Guatemala		2		4	6
Jordan		3			3
Mexico		1			1
Nepal		3			3
Paraguay		1	5	77	83
Peru		3			3
Philippines		2	14	121	137
Sri Lanka		3			3
United States of America		3			3
Uruguay		6			6
Total	**1**	**53**	**69**	**1 353**	**1 476**

[a] The Force Commander is employed on a United Nations contract and hence is not reflected in the troop strength.

Map No. 4224 Rev. 49 UNITED NATIONS
July 2017

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

United Nations S/2017/605

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 July 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 12 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am writing to you with reference to the attached list of letters from the Syrian regime's representative (see annex).

Turkey categorically refutes the spurious allegations contained in those and other letters to the same effect. They are, yet again, futile efforts aimed at distorting reality and undermining the documented facts regarding the atrocities committed by the regime, which amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The regime, which lost its legitimacy long ago, is the very root cause of all the problems emanating from the Syrian conflict and will be held accountable for its crimes.

As underlined in our previous letters addressed to the Security Council, Turkey will not hesitate to exercise its inherent right of self-defence as outlined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations in response to threats to its national security.

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feridun H. **Sinirlioğlu**
Permanent Representative

17-11827 (E) 170717

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 12 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

List of letters

- Letter dated 11 July 2017 (PM/2017/255)
- Letter dated 11 July 2017, issued as document S/2017/595
- Letter dated 7 July 2017 (PM/2017/251)
- Letter dated 6 July 2017 (PM/2017/248)
- Letter dated 6 July 2017, issued as document S/2017/582
- Letter dated 6 July 2017 (PM/2017/244)
- Letter dated 5 July 2017 (PM/2017/242)
- Letter dated 3 July 2017 (PM/2017/238)
- Letter dated 26 June 2017, issued as document S/2017/545
- Letter dated 30 May 2017 (PM/2017/201)
- Letter dated 29 May 2017, issued as document S/2017/459
- Letter dated 28 May 2017, issued as document S/2017/458
- Letter dated 27 May 2017, issued as document S/2017/457
- Letter dated 9 May 2017 (PM/2017/169)
- Letter dated 26 April 2017, issued as document S/2017/364
- Letter dated 26 April 2017 (PM/2017/154)
- Letter dated 25 April 2017, issued as document S/2017/352
- Letter dated 16 April 2017, issued as document S/2017/327
- Letter dated 4 April 2017, issued as document S/2017/281
- Letter dated 3 April 2017, issued as document S/2017/280
- Letter dated 30 March 2017, issued as document S/2017/267
- Letter dated 23 March 2017, issued as document S/2017/246

United Nations S/2017/606

Security Council

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14 July 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 11 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to attach herewith the press statement issued by the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Sudan on 10 July 2017, in which it welcomes the statement issued by the United Nations country team in the Sudan on the marked improvement of humanitarian access in the country (see annex).

In its statement, the country team confirmed the following:

> The revision of the Government of the Sudan's Directives and Procedures for Humanitarian Action in December 2016 has allowed for improvements in the scope and quality of humanitarian access. Recent months have seen United Nations agencies and partners increasingly working in areas that were previously inaccessible, to carry out needs assessments and provide humanitarian assistance. Notable areas of increased access include parts of the Jebel Marra region in Darfur, some of which had remained inaccessible to humanitarian actors for the past seven years.

(*Signed*) Omer Dahab Fadl **Mohamed**
Permanent Representative

17-11958 (E) 180717 180717

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 11 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Information Department

Press statement

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomes the statement that the United Nations country team in the Sudan issued on Monday, 10 July 2017. In that statement, the country team expressed its hopes for a positive decision on the lifting of the American sanctions that have been imposed on the Sudan. The Ministry expresses its satisfaction that the facts and evidence contained in the statement confirmed that the Sudan and the international community are cooperating closely with regard to humanitarian matters at the regional and international levels.

The Ministry greatly appreciates the constructive tone of the statement and reiterates that the Government of the Sudan welcomes the American proposal to deliver humanitarian assistance to the Two Areas, particularly given the heightened confidence and optimism that was engendered by the decision of the President of the Republic to extend the unilateral ceasefire and in view of the continued provision of humanitarian assistance by official and civilian State institutions to their brethren in South Sudan.

The Ministry takes this opportunity to reiterate that the Government of the Sudan is determined and committed to continuing and enhancing its cooperation with the United Nations and all humanitarian partners. It will make every effort to achieve lasting peace and sustained development in the country and work diligently with regional and international partners to maintain international peace and security.

Issued on 10 July 2017

Ambassador Qaribullah **Khidr**
Official spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic]

Statement attributable to the United Nations Country Team in Sudan

United Nations Hopes for Positive Decision on US Sanctions Relief

Khartoum, 10 July 2017. The United Nations Country Team (UNCT) in Sudan acknowledges that there has been a marked improvement in humanitarian access over the past six months, since Executive Order 13761 was signed on 13 January 2017, as a result of improved engagement between the Government of Sudan and humanitarian actors. The revision of the Government of Sudan's Directives and Procedures for Humanitarian Action in December 2016 has allowed for improvements in the scope and quality of humanitarian access. Recent months have seen UN agencies and partners increasingly working in areas that were previously inaccessible, to carry out needs assessments and provide humanitarian assistance. Notable areas of increased access include parts of the Jebel Marra region in Darfur, some of which had remained inaccessible to humanitarian actors for the past seven years.

While full humanitarian access remains a challenge in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states — particularly in areas under the control of armed groups, which remain inaccessible — UN agencies and partners are now able to provide humanitarian assistance in a number of government-controlled areas which were previously blocked. This has allowed essential assistance to reach previously underserved communities, including assistance in health, food, nutrition, water, sanitation, child protection, education and mine action. In response to the declaration of famine in parts of South Sudan in February 2017, the UNCT has worked closely with the Government of Sudan to support South Sudanese refugees inside Sudan, as well as to establish and operationalise three humanitarian corridors, facilitating the delivery of essential food aid to South Sudan.

Improved engagement between humanitarian actors and the Government of Sudan has recently led to agreement on a set of positive reforms to recruitment procedures for INGOs, increasing their operational independence in the country. The UNCT has also observed increased acceptance for national NGOs working in the field, as well as increased engagement of civil society and the private sector on humanitarian issues.

While the UNCT recognises that regulatory improvements can take time to fully materialise on the ground, and that some issues remain to be addressed, the past months have clearly shown that constructive engagement is the best way to maintain the progress already made, as well as to collectively resolve pending issues.

The UNCT looks forward to the decision that will shortly be taken on the sanctions, and is committed to continue its engagement in order to further improve humanitarian access.

United Nations S/2017/607

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 July 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 11 July 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey herewith a report of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the status of the implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya (see annex). The report, dated 23 June 2017, covers the period from 23 May to 22 June 2017.

The report was prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-52/DEC.1 of 20 July 2016 and Security Council resolution 2298 (2016) of 22 July 2016, for transmission to the Security Council.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

17-11963 (E) 170717

Please recycle

Annex

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled "Status of the implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya", prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-52/DEC.1, dated 20 July 2016, and United Nations Security Council resolution 2298 (2016), dated 22 July 2016, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 23 May to 22 June 2017 and also covers the reporting requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-52/DEC.2, dated 27 July 2016, and EC-M-53/DEC.1, dated 26 August 2016.

(*Signed*) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Report of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Status of the implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya

1. At its Fifty-Second Meeting, the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") adopted a decision on the "Destruction of Libya's Remaining Chemical Weapons" (EC-M-52/DEC.1, dated 20 July 2016) and requested the Director-General to assist Libya in developing a modified plan of destruction of Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons. On 22 July 2016, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2298 (2016), welcoming and endorsing the decision by the Council and requesting the Director General, through the Secretary General, to report to the Security Council on a regular basis until the destruction is complete and verified.

2. At the conclusion of its Fifty-Second Meeting, the Council adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Libya's Remaining Category 2 Chemical Weapons" (EC-M-52/DEC.2, dated 27 July 2016). In operative paragraph 17 of that decision, the Council requested the Director-General to report to the Council on a monthly basis on the implementation of the decision. This tenth monthly report covers the period from 23 May to 22 June 2017.

Progress in the elimination of Libyan chemical weapons by the State Party hosting destruction activities

3. Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung von chemischen Kampfstoffen und Rüstungsaltlasten mbH (GEKA mbH), the designated destruction facility at Munster, Germany, completed the destruction of the 2-chloroethanol and tributylamine on 17 December 2016 and 20 January 2017, respectively.

4. As previously reported (EC-85/DG.1, dated 23 March 2017), the destruction of phosphorous trichloride was suspended as a necessary precaution in order to prevent the refractory coating from severe damage. Destruction totals for phosphorous trichloride remain at 3.2 metric tonnes (MT), or 2.8%.

5. Using the incinerator in Incinerator Plant 1 ("Munster 1"), GEKA mbH began the destruction of thionylchloride on 24 March 2017. Feed rates into the incinerator are low, so as to avoid damage to the incinerator. As at 19 June 2017, 9.77 MT, or 9.77%, of the thionylchloride had been destroyed.

6. Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") teams continue to inspect GEKA mbH every two months, with the last such inspection having been conducted from 22 to 24 May 2017. No issues were encountered with the destruction process.

7. GEKA mbH and the Host State have notified the Secretariat that the required permits to alter the destruction technology from incineration to neutralisation have been approved. GEKA mbH anticipates changing from incineration to neutralisation in the first week of July 2017.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to Libya

8. The Secretariat inspected the destruction operations at GEKA mbH between 22 and 24 May 2017. The Secretariat inspection team confirmed that all verification measures were in place and verified the destruction through on-site confirmation and review of video recordings.

9. The next inspection at GEKA mbH is scheduled to take place from 26 to 28 June 2017. The Secretariat will assess the verification procedures for the neutralisation process and confirm the destruction since the last inspection.

10. The Secretariat continues to discuss with GEKA mbH the timelines for the completion of destruction of the remaining chemicals.

11. As previously reported, the Secretariat was informed that during decanting operations at the Ruwagha storage facility, one container experienced an exothermic reaction, causing the material inside to polymerise. Owing to the levels of the Category 2 chemicals remaining in the container (approximately 5%), the viscous nature of the remnants, and the limited ability to recover any usable material, the Secretariat is in a position to affirm that the material no longer presents a proliferation threat.

12. In line with decision EC-M-51/DEC.1 (dated 24 February 2016), the Secretariat has concluded an agreement with the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS) to contract a Libyan firm to complete the destruction of the one remaining tank at the Ruwagha facility. The viscous nature of the material remaining in the tank will require reloading of a partial amount to allow for hydrolysis of the material. Hydrolysis tests were conducted at the OPCW Laboratory on samples obtained from the tank, with a view to providing the correct methodology for destruction.

13. Destruction of the remaining tank is scheduled to begin in the week of 26 June 2017. Destruction operations will be limited to the remaining tank and will not affect the Secretariat's ability to obtain samples from the Ruwagha Tank Farm.

14. The Secretariat, in accordance with the report of the Council at its Eighty-Third Session (paragraph 6.12 of EC-83/5, dated 11 November 2016), continues to consult with the United Nations Office of Safety and Security (UNDSS) as to the possibility of Secretariat personnel travelling to Ruwagha to obtain soil samples. The UNDSS is currently advising against such travel. The Secretariat will continue to monitor the situation.

Overall costs and status of the trust fund

15. On 1 August 2016, the Secretariat issued a Note calling for voluntary contributions to the trust fund for support to Libya (S/1400/2016, dated 1 August 2016). As at the cut off date of this report, the trust fund had received over EUR 1.2 million, with contributions having been received from Canada, Cyprus, Finland, New Zealand, and the United States of America. An additional EUR 133,638 was received from Canada in the form of a transfer of funds from a previous trust fund dedicated to Libya. As at the cut-off date of this report, expenses in the amount of EUR 708,960 had been charged to the trust fund for activities related to the destruction of Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons. This figure represents a decrease from last month, due to liquidation of outstanding obligations.

16. The trust fund continues to be used to fund activities related to Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons. The OPCW has concluded an agreement with

UNOPS, utilising funding from Cyprus, Finland, and New Zealand for the destruction of the remaining tank at Ruwagha.

17. The Secretariat has hired an expert company to develop a programme of work and budget for the clean-up operations of the Ruwagha Tank Farm. The programme of work and budget will be presented to potential donors for their consideration. The Secretariat acknowledges the request by the Council at its Eighty-Third Session to obtain soil samples from the area surrounding decanted Category 2 chemical tanks (paragraph 6.12 of EC-83/5). No action will be taken until sufficient soil samples can be obtained.

18. The Director-General would once again like to express his appreciation to those States Parties that have already made or have committed to making voluntary contributions to the trust fund.

United Nations S/2017/608

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 July 2017
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 14 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 11-14 July 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) P. **Ilichev**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

17-12198 (E) 200717 210717

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Annex to the letter dated 14 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (11 July 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported three incidents of gunfire: two in Ladhiqiyah governorate and one in Hama governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported eight violations in the following governorates: six in Damascus, one in Homs and one in Hama.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out three humanitarian operations in Aleppo city, delivering 3.6 tons of food parcels and water to the local population.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 410 people.

In total, 1,466 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 321 people.

Two United Nations humanitarian operations were carried out:

The Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr;

Eighteen truckloads of humanitarian cargo were delivered to Tafas in Dar'a governorate.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, 10 ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas in Homs governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process stands at 2,011.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (12 July 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported one incident of gunfire in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported 10 violations in the following governorates: 4 in Damascus, 4 in Dar'a, 1 in Idlib and 1 in Suwayda'.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out six humanitarian operations in Aleppo city and one humanitarian operation in Jiblaya in Homs governorate, delivering 4.96 tons of food parcels to the local population.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 1,558 people.

In total, 1,473 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 311 people.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 2,011.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (13 July 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: three in Ladhiqiyah, two in Damascus and one in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has reported five violations in the following governorates: three in Damascus, one in Hama and one in Homs.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out three humanitarian operations in Aleppo city, delivering 3.6 tons of drinking water to the local population.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 1,130 people.

In total, 1,476 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 207 people.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 2,011.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (14 July 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported 12 incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: 9 in Ladhiqiyah, 2 in Aleppo and 1 in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has reported 11 violations: 8 in Damascus governorate and 3 in Dar'a governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out seven humanitarian operations:

Six operations in Aleppo city, during which 3.1 tons of food parcels were delivered to the local population;

One operation in Homs governorate, during which 1.7 tons of food parcels were delivered to the local population.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo was 4.8 tons.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 1,510 people.

In total, 1,483 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 423 people.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out:

The Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process stands at 2,011.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.

United Nations S/2017/609

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 July 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 14 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Namibia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 14 July 2017 from the Secretary-General of the Frente Polisario, Brahim Ghali, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Neville **Gertze**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-12082 (E) 200717

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 14 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Namibia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I would like to draw your attention to a serious development relating to the question of Western Sahara that may have adverse consequences for the ongoing United Nations peace process therein and challenge its responsibility regarding the protection of the territorial integrity of this Non-Self-Governing Territory.

On 6 July 2017, the Government of Morocco adopted a bill on delimiting the Moroccan exclusive economic zone, including the waters off Western Sahara, with a view to "cementing" Morocco's illegal occupation and annexation of the Territory.

The Frente Polisario considers this bill null and void as it constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and the status of Western Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory on the United Nations agenda since 1963. It also represents a blatant disregard for the ruling of the International Court of Justice of 1975 and the judgment of the European Court of Justice of 2016, which reaffirm that Morocco has no sovereignty over Western Sahara, which enjoys, by virtue of the principle of self-determination, a status separate and distinct from that of any other State, including Morocco.

Throughout its occupation of parts of Western Sahara, Morocco had never made an express claim to maritime zones adjacent to the coast of the Territory as it knows very well that such a declaration would be devoid of any legal value under international law. However, Morocco has always sought control over those areas by entering into commercial arrangements with foreign interests for the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources therein. Such arrangements include fisheries licences pursuant to the 2007 Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco, and reconnaissance and exploration licences in respect of Western Sahara's seabed petroleum resources.

The proposed bill is therefore a clear attempt by Morocco to consolidate its illegal annexation of Western Sahara. Moreover, if adopted, the bill will constitute a serious violation of the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people and all its components, including the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources. It will also be a violation of other peremptory norms of international law, including the inadmissibility of acquiring territories by force. Moreover, Morocco gave an implicit assurance, by accepting the United Nations-sponsored ceasefire and the referendum agreement, that the territorial status of Western Sahara was to remain unchanged pending self-determination. Therefore, without a substantial consultation with and the expressed consent of the Sahrawi people and their internationally-recognized representative, Frente Polisario, Morocco has no competence under international law to declare or establish, by litigation or negotiation with adjacent States, maritime boundaries for Western Sahara.

As you may be aware, on 21 January 2009, the Government of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) declared an exclusive economic zone, making official the exclusive rights of the Sahrawi people to the living and non-living resources (including oil, gas and fisheries) within 200 nautical miles offshore of the internationally recognized territory of Western Sahara, as provided for under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The declaration of Sahrawi maritime zones, which defines a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea and a 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone for SADR, was a further step aimed at preserving and taking control of the Sahrawi natural riches, which have been plundered illegally for many years by Morocco and other foreign interests. In

his report of 13 April 2009 on Western Sahara (S/2009/200), the Secretary-General of the United Nations referred to the declaration of Sahrawi maritime zones and to the fact that "the declaration was based on the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and to permanent sovereignty over their natural resources" (para. 4).

Therefore, due to the imperative nature of the international standards involved, all States and international organizations, including the United Nations, have an obligation under international law not to recognize, either de jure or de facto, the exclusive economic zone proposed by Morocco insofar as it includes the territorial waters of Western Sahara.

In view of the above, I would like to call on you to use your authority as Secretary-General to protect the territorial integrity of the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Western Sahara, including its territorial waters, in the face of Morocco's proposed move that will only further complicate the situation on the ground. It will also hinder the relaunching of the negotiating process with a new dynamic and a new spirit between the two parties, Morocco and the Frente Polisario, as recently called for by the Security Council.

In this regard, I would like to reiterate to you the readiness of the Frente Polisario to engage in serious negotiations with Morocco, under the auspices of the United Nations, with a view to achieving a peaceful and lasting solution that will provide for the inalienable right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination.

(*Signed*) Brahim **Ghali**
Secretary-General of the Frente Polisario

United Nations A/71/985–S/2017/610

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
17 July 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 61
Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 14 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith an answer given by a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), which was given to the question raised by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on 14 July 2017 with regard to attempts of the United States to fabricate another "sanctions resolution" against the DPRK (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ja** Song Nam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-12059 (E) 200717

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 14 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Answer given by a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 14 July 2017 with regard to the fact that the United States is attempting to rig up another "sanctions resolution" against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, branding its successful test-fire of the intercontinental ballistic missile as a "global threat"

The U.S., flabbergasted at the DPRK's success in the test-fire of the intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14, is making frenzied moves at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to fabricate another "resolution on sanctions" tougher than ever against the DPRK.

Right after the emergency meeting of the UNSC, the U.S. began letting out a stream of invectives every day against the DPRK's test-fire while making frantic efforts together with its vassal forces to produce a "press statement" in order to create the atmosphere of sanctions against the DPRK. At the same time, the U.S. is causing a lot of racket circulating the draft of a new "resolution on sanctions" at the UNSC and prattling that it would to put it to the "vote" without any compromise.

The racket of anti-DPRK "sanctions resolutions" being made by the U.S. is the manifestation of the heinous intention to evade the responsibility for having driven the DPRK to bolster its nuclear force by pursuing the policy of extreme hostility and nuclear threat against the latter and obliterate its sovereignty and right to existence.

The DPRK's test-fire of the intercontinental ballistic rocket is an exercise of its legitimate right to self-defence to thoroughly eradicate the over half a century long nuclear threat from the U.S. against the DPRK and reliably defend peace and stability of the Korean peninsula and the region at large.

The resounding success of the test-fire of the intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 has fully demonstrated the will and capability of the DPRK to annihilate the U.S. by a single blow to the very heart of its mainland in case it fails to act with discretion.

It is time for the U.S. to renew its perspective on the DPRK's strategic position, which has reached the dazzling heights, and to act with prudence. However, it is inviting its ultimate doom by resorting to the sanctions and pressure campaign against the DPRK.

It will be a fatal mistake to consider any chance that the DPRK, which rose to a dignified nuclear power and an ICBM state, would tolerate the reckless "sanctions" racket of the U.S. and other hostile forces.

Should the UNSC adopt another "resolution on sanctions", this will trigger corresponding measures by the DPRK and respond to the "resolution" with its act of justice.

United Nations A/71/982–S/2017/600

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
14 July 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 118
The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 12 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Turkmenistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the Ashgabat Declaration of the high-level United Nations-Central Asia dialogue on implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia, which was held in Ashgabat on 13 June 2017 and was attended at the ministerial level by representatives from the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan (see annex).

I would be very grateful if you would kindly circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 118, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Aksoltan Ataeva
Permanent Representative

17-11964 (E) 190717

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 12 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Turkmenistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Ashgabat Declaration

1. We, the representatives of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan, have convened at the ministerial level on the initiative of the United Nations Secretary-General and the Government of Turkmenistan on 13 June 2017, in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, for the "High-Level United Nations-Central Asia Dialogue on Implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia". The High-Level Dialogue reviewed the progress made and defined future strategic priorities for the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia, including the Joint Plan of Action, which was adopted in this city on 30 November 2011.

2. We strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and recognize that the prevention of terrorism is one of the most important components of ensuring national and regional security. We also affirm that terrorism should not be associated with any religion, nationality, culture, civilization or ethnic group.

3. We welcome the important role of the United Nations in international counter-terrorism efforts, as well as the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and Security Council with regard to countering terrorism.

4. We welcome the recent initiative of the Secretary-General to reform the United Nations counter-terrorism architecture by establishing a new Office of Counter-Terrorism, and we look forward to working closely with this new Office. We also recognize the valuable support of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Office and UNRCCA in the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action, as well as the expertise provided by other international, regional and subregional organizations operating in Central Asia. We also note with appreciation that this year marks the tenth anniversary of the establishment of UNRCCA.

5. We agree to further strengthen our cooperation and coordination with the United Nations and other relevant entities, with a view to ensuring the effective implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly with regard to countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism. While the primary responsibility to implement the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy remains with us as Member States of the United Nations, we appeal for increased engagement by our bilateral partners, as well as international and regional organizations in support of its implementation.

6. We note that Central Asia is the first region where comprehensive, integrated and balanced implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was started. To this end, we recognize with satisfaction the achievements of the first two phases of the joint UNCCT-UNRCCA project "Towards the Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action for the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia", which is funded by the European Union and Norway, and have agreed that on this very strong foundation, and as a way forward, we will continue to support a balanced implementation of the four pillars of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy through a third phase of this project.

7. We request for the continued support of the United Nations, in particular, through its Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, to further assist in the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action, by coordinating efforts, helping build capacity, and supporting a platform for regular exchanges of information on progress towards implementation.

8. We intend to exert all necessary efforts to counter new threats identified in the fifth review resolution of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, including the recommendations of the United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, through promoting dialogue and conflict prevention, addressing the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon, promoting youth engagement, skills development and employment facilitation, countering terrorist narrative and the misuse of information technology, as well as sharing of information and best practices.

9. We further call for greater coherence by partners, United Nations entities, as well as other regional and international organizations supporting our activities, including the use of the Matrix of Activities of regional and international organizations in supporting the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action in Central Asia, jointly prepared by CTITF and UNRCCA, to coordinate their work.

10. We also express our gratitude to the Government of Turkmenistan for their initiative and warm welcome in hosting the "High-Level United Nations-Central Asia Dialogue on Implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia" in Ashgabat.

11. Adopted on 13th of June 2017 by the participants of the "High-Level United Nations-Central Asia Dialogue on Implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia", in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan.

Ashgabat, 13 June 2017

United Nations A/71/979–S/2017/601

General Assembly
Security Council

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12 July 2017

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 6 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am transmitting to your attention the statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic on the provocation of the Azerbaijani side along the line of contact between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan on 4 July 2017 (see annex).

Following the armed aggression launched by Azerbaijan in April 2016, which claimed numerous lives, including among the civilian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, two meetings were held between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Vienna on 16 May 2016 and in Saint Petersburg on 20 June 2016, under the auspices of the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). To reduce the risk of further violence, it was agreed to finalize in the shortest possible time an OSCE investigative mechanism for ceasefire violations, to expand the existing Office of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and to increase the number of international observers.

By consistently rejecting the creation of an investigative mechanism for ceasefire violations and the deployment of an increased number of international observers on the line of contact, Azerbaijan unequivocally reveals its failure and lack of interest in the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In their statement of 18 May 2017, for example, the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group were explicit in identifying Azerbaijan as the party initiating the ceasefire violations.

As long as Azerbaijan rejects the implementation of the agreements reached in Vienna and Saint Petersburg and fails to adhere to its international commitments under the 1994 and 1995 trilateral ceasefire agreements between Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, the leadership of Azerbaijan bears full responsibility for all the human casualties, regardless of their nationality. Armenia grieves the loss of all lives and urges Azerbaijan to immediately halt its continuing ceasefire violations and provocations and to adhere strictly and without further delay to its commitments to strengthen the ceasefire regime and to create an atmosphere conducive for moving the peace process forward.

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I kindly request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 6 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the Information and Public Relations Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Artsakh

5 July 2017

In the evening of 4 July 2017, the Azerbaijani side committed yet another provocation, firing at the territory of the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh Republic). For the first time since the aggression in April 2016, the armed forces of Azerbaijan employed a TR-107 multiple rocket launcher system. The fire was launched from the positions located in close proximity to residential buildings in the village of Alkhanlu.

The Defence Army of Artsakh was forced to take countermeasures to suppress the fire activity of the Azerbaijani army. The incident provoked by the Azerbaijani side, unfortunately, led to casualties among the villagers.

Since the aggression in April 2016 up to now, we have repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that the Azerbaijani side, in violation of all the norms of international humanitarian law, does not disdain to use its civilian population as a human shield for shelling the territory of Artsakh.

The peaceful population on both sides of the border has long become a hostage to the Azerbaijani authorities' policy of constant escalation of tensions on the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan and of sabotaging the efforts of the mediators to restore the negotiation process.

The incident once again confirms the importance of the agreements reached at the summits of 16 May 2016 in Vienna and of 20 June 2016 in Saint Petersburg, aimed at the stabilization of the situation on the line of contact. The immediate implementation of these agreements, torpedoed by Azerbaijan, will allow for the prevention of the recurrence of such incidents in the future.

United Nations S/2017/602

Security Council

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14 July 2017
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 12 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, and further to previous letters concerning the attacks by armed terrorist groups on oil and gas facilities and personnel in the Syrian Arab Republic, I would like to convey to you the following information:

- On 6 May 2017, armed terrorist groups fired two mortar shells at the Muhradah natural gas pressure reduction and metering station in Hama governorate, causing considerable damage to the station.
- On 25 May 2017, armed terrorist groups attacked the Zayzun gas station in Idlib governorate, stole mechanical equipment at the station and caused much destruction to other equipment.
- In the month of May 2017, armed terrorist groups attacked the shutoff valve station on the Arak-Aleppo gas line in the Dayr Hafir district of Aleppo governorate, destroying or stealing equipment.
- On 12 June 2017, armed terrorist groups used improvised explosive devices to attack the Arab gas pipeline in the Baytariyah district in Rif Dimashq governorate.

The attacks by armed terrorist groups have caused enormous material losses following the damage to oil and gas facilities and infrastructure, severely jeopardizing various aspects of life for Syrian citizens, due to interruptions and shortages of electricity and fuel and the associated negative consequences on the delivery of heating services and essential goods and services for daily life.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mounzer **Mounzer**
Minister Plenipotentiary
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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United Nations S/2017/603

Security Council

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14 July 2017
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 12 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, and further to previous letters relating to the aerial bombardments carried out by aircraft of the so-called international coalition led by the United States of America on villages and areas populated by civilians and on oil and gas infrastructure and facilities in the Syrian Arab Republic, I wish to convey to you the following information:

- On 22 April 2017, aircraft of this illegitimate "international coalition" bombed a gas station in the north-central part of Tuwaynan district in Raqqah governorate.
- On 29 and 30 May 2017, aircraft of this illegitimate "international coalition" bombed gas wells in the Tabiyah district in Dayr al-Zawr governorate.
- On 27 May 2017, aircraft of this illegitimate coalition bombed the village of Hasu Albu Awf in the district of Shaddadah in Hasakah governorate, completely destroying many homes and killing civilians, most of them children. Of the victims, the following have been identified: Ayd Abdullah al-Husyan, Farhan Ayd al-Husayn and Amal al-Khidr, and children such as Muhammad Farhan al-Husayn, born in 2007, Sarah Farhan al-Husayn, born in 2009, Ibrahim Farhan al-Husayn, born in 2010, Zahrah Farhan al-Husayn, born in 2016, and Yusuf Fariq al-Husayn, born in 2016.

The repeated bombardments by this illegitimate "international coalition" continue to claim the lives of hundreds of innocent Syrian civilians and to cause significant material losses and the near-total destruction of Syrian facilities, homes and infrastructure, as well as the utter destruction of Syrian oil and gas facilities and sites. The attacks by the so-called international coalition, together with the illegal unilateral coercive economic measures imposed on the Syrian Arab Republic by the United States of America, the European Union and other States are impeding the maintenance of those economic facilities and jeopardizing the prospects for development and reconstruction in the Syrian Arab Republic.

My Government reaffirms its position that the attacks by the so-called international coalition against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant within the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic are illegal and violate the Charter of the United Nations and international law, inasmuch as they are being carried out without prior authorization from or coordination with the Syrian Government. My Government insists that these attacks must come to an end, and that the members of

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this illegitimate coalition must bear the political and legal responsibility for the destruction of infrastructure in the Syrian Arab Republic, including responsibility for compensation.

I should be grateful if this letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mounzer **Mounzer**
Minister Plenipotentiary
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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12 July 2017

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2350 (2017), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for a final period of six months, until 15 October 2017; established the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) for an initial period of six months, from 16 October 2017 until 15 April 2018; and requested a report on the implementation of the resolution within 90 days. It covers major developments that have occurred since the issuance of my previous report, of 16 March 2017 (S/2017/223), and progress made on the closing-down of MINUSTAH and the establishment of MINUJUSTH.

II. Developments on the ground

A. Political

2. Haiti has continued to make strides in the consolidation of its democracy and stability. On 22 March, following Parliament's endorsement, the Prime Minister of Haiti, Jack Guy Lafontant, and his 18-member Cabinet of Ministers, which includes five women, assumed their functions. On 29 March, the President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, presented the new Cabinet with a road map for the Government focused on the security, justice, energy, education, health and agriculture sectors and based on decentralization as a strategy for transforming and modernizing the State to better meet the needs of the people and key national sectors.

3. On 29 March, the thirtieth anniversary of the 1987 Constitution, the Lower Chamber of Parliament launched a special commission, tasked with delivering a report on its assessment of the Constitution by January 2019. Shortly afterwards, on 10 April, the executive branch and the legislature adopted a joint legislative agenda comprising 51 draft laws aimed at improving the business climate, reinforcing State functions and ensuring better territorial planning, particularly with regard to the rehabilitation of the environment. The agenda includes a draft bill on the remobilization of the Haitian Armed Forces, which the executive branch and the legislature consider to be a priority in the context of the closure of MINUSTAH.

4. On 8 May, the final results of the 29 January 2017 local elections, announced by the Provisional Electoral Council, were published in the official gazette, with 9

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of the 570 communal sections requiring reruns because of a lack of registered candidates, violence or tied results. To complete the local governance structure envisaged in the Constitution, indirect elections are now required for the establishment of the municipal and departmental assemblies and the departmental and interdepartmental councils. On 29 June, the provisional electoral council announced the calendar for the indirect elections that will be held between 1 July and 26 September.

5. On 17 May, President Moïse completed his first 100 days in office. Among notable actions taken during that period was his flagship initiative, "Caravan of Change", consisting of monthly visits to the regions aimed at revitalizing the agricultural, environmental and transport sectors as set out in the government programme. On 15 May, as a first step to end government subsidies, fuel prices were increased following negotiations with trade unions. On 5 June, in the wake of protests by workers' unions demanding an increase in the minimum wage, the Government reconstituted the Superior Council of Salaries, which released for consideration its recommendations on a new minimum wage scale on 7 July.

6. On 6 June, at the request of President Moïse, Parliament convened an extraordinary session to amend the national budget for the fiscal year from October 2016 to September 2017, which was approved by the Government on 2 June. The generally conservative budget as adopted by Parliament provides 75.91 billion gourdes ($1.2 billion) for operations and 42.77 billion gourdes ($680 million) for investments, and is aimed at tightening central government spending, maintaining macroeconomic stability and limiting the fiscal deficit, currently estimated at 5.8 billion gourdes ($93.7 million) for the fiscal year 2016/17, to a sustainable level. Capital expenditures to boost growth remain limited, and subsidies to the State-owned electricity authority continue. Despite increased allocations for agriculture, the environment and education, investments in those growth-enhancing sectors remain low. The fragile socioeconomic situation continues to contribute to the increased vulnerability of Haitian households, particularly affecting girls and women, whose voices have been largely absent from the political processes relating to these issues. On 30 June, the executive branch submitted the draft budget for the fiscal year 2017/18 before the Lower Chamber, for a total amount of 144.2 billion gourdes ($2.3 billion), representing an increase of 22.1 per cent compared with the previous year.

7. Prior to the closing of the first ordinary session of the 2017 legislative year on 8 May, Parliament adopted a law strengthening the national fire department and ratified two international conventions on statelessness. Parliament also voted to amend the draft organic law on the financial intelligence unit strengthening measures against money-laundering and terrorism financing, thereby averting the risk of financial isolation by the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force.

B. Security

8. Growing tensions linked to socioeconomic grievances notwithstanding, key indicators, including crime and civil protests, remained within historically established statistical parameters. The ongoing withdrawal of the MINUSTAH military and police components, including the closure of military bases in the northern departments and Cité Soleil and the gradual transfer of security tasks to the Haitian National Police, has not affected the overall security situation.

9. Crime statistics collected by the national police and MINUSTAH for the period from 1 March to 30 June 2017 indicated a slight increase, with 356 reported homicides, compared with 345 during the same period in the previous year. Nearly

78 per cent of the homicides (278) remained concentrated in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. Seven national police officers were killed, compared with 10 officers killed during the same period in 2016. Kidnappings dropped to 9 cases, compared with 19 during the same period in 2016, as did instances of rape, with 188 cases, compared with 196. However, as highlighted in my previous report, evidence of underreporting and a culture of impunity remain pervasive, particularly in cases of sexual and gender-based violence.

10. A total of 288 public protests were recorded, of which 75 (26 per cent) registered some violence, ranging from erected barricades and stone-throwing to assaults against police officers and shootings. This represents a decrease compared with the 382 incidents, of which 117 (31 per cent) were violent, reported during the same period in 2016. The metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince registered 44 per cent of those incidents, followed by the remaining areas of the West Department (20 per cent). Of the 288 incidents, approximately 93 per cent involved fewer than 1,000 people, with no protests involving more than 3,000. The vast majority of these protests were triggered by socioeconomic grievances, related to education, health, labour and the cost of living, and damage caused by heavy rains.

11. On 7 April, an attack against the presidential motorcade was reported in Arcahaie (West Department). Although no casualties resulted from the attack, its precise circumstances have yet to be clarified by an ongoing national police investigation. The incident fuelled perceptions of increasing insecurity. On 13 May, the Secretary of State for Public Security, Jeantel Joseph, who is also the head of Senator-elect Guy Philippe's Consortium party, was replaced by Léon Ronsard Saint-Cyr, former Minister of the Interior and Local Governance. Guy Phillipe is currently facing a nine-year jail term in the United States of America for drug-smuggling and money-laundering.

12. The Mission's police component continued to provide operational support to the national police, conducting 2,624 joint temporary checkpoints, 2,825 foot patrols, 19,864 vehicle patrols and 296 joint operations, including 163 in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. Military troops carried out 4,046 operations, 163 of which were joint patrols with Haitian and MINUSTAH police officers.

C. Haitian National Police

13. The Haitian National Police continued to strengthen its capacities in providing security and ensuring law and order throughout the country. The twenty-seventh promotion, comprising 946 new police officers, including 80 women, graduated on 27 March, bringing the size of the force to approximately 14,000 police officers, of whom 1,301, or 9 per cent, are women. The police-to-population ratio reached 1.3 police officers per 1,000 inhabitants. The graduates were assigned primarily to reinforce specialized units and the Directorate of Prison Administration and were deployed to various departments to ensure prompt responses in crime-prone areas. On 21 May, the twenty-eighth promotion of 1,042 cadets, including 129 women, began training; the promotion is expected to graduate by December, which will bring the total strength of the Haitian National Police above the targeted number of 15,000 personnel. National police infrastructure remained a priority, with the completion of 13 new projects, funded by MINUSTAH quick-impact projects and bilateral contributors.

14. The draft Haitian National Police strategic development plan for the period 2017-2021 was completed with MINUSTAH support, following consultations with national and international stakeholders. The plan, which identifies long-term institution-building objectives, was presented to the President and the Prime

Minister on 28 June and was subsequently adopted by the Prime Minister in his capacity as President of the Superior Council of the National Police, on 5 July.

D. Rule of law and human rights

15. Limited progress was made during the reporting period in the performance of the judicial institutions and in the administration of justice, with key appointments to the Supreme Court pending action by Parliament and the executive branch. A strike called in April by the civil servants' union of the Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes paralysed its operations.

16. On a positive note, on 25 April the draft criminal code and the draft criminal procedure code were submitted to Parliament by the executive branch, while a committee submitted a draft law on legal aid to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security on 11 May. Some progress was noted in curbing prolonged pretrial detention through the establishment of a real-time case file management process in the court of first instance in Port-au-Prince, resulting in the closing of 126 cases. Through the penal chain committee, MINUSTAH helped to develop monthly case-tracking tools and performance indicators for investigating judges, which accelerated the completion of 257 pretrial investigations in Port-au-Prince and 139 in Cap-Haïtien, compared with 400 and 250, respectively, for all of 2016.

17. Prolonged pretrial detention and prison overcrowding remain serious human rights concerns. On 19 May, Haitian prisons counted 10,512 detainees, including 349 women and 240 male and 15 female juveniles; 71 per cent were awaiting trial, reflecting no decrease since the issuance of my previous report. The publication of the first report of the special presidential commission on prison conditions, established in February, was awaited, while deaths in detention had further increased to 115 as at 30 May, compared with the 113 reported for the full year 2016.

18. Under the joint interim rule of law programme of MINUSTAH and the United Nations Development Programme, a team of international experts reviewed a draft penitentiary law aimed at modernizing the management of the Directorate of Prison Administration. The Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes was also supported in its review of the organization and functioning of the Court, with a view to helping strengthen efforts to fight impunity and the misappropriation of public funds. As part of the transition to local actors, a forum was organized with the Haitian Chamber of Commerce and Industry to discuss the development of public-private partnerships with businesses to support the reinsertion of released detainees.

19. Community violence reduction activities, reaching 87,711 beneficiaries through 31 projects totalling $5 million, were ongoing, while 37 projects totalling $6.5 million that reached 53,766 beneficiaries were closing. Projects were focused on vocational training, labour-intensive infrastructure, sexual and gender-based violence, legal aid and related issues.

20. MINUSTAH continued to advocate more systematic investigations into the use of force and firearms by national police officers. Civil society organizations, including the International Federation for Human Rights, called upon the Government to prioritize the fight against impunity for serious crimes committed in the past, insisting that the trial for crimes committed under the late President Jean-Claude Duvalier take place, after years of judicial inaction following the decision handed down by an appellate court in February 2014. If enacted, a draft law against defamation, voted on by the Senate in March and awaiting adoption by the Lower

Chamber, could jeopardize freedom of expression, in contravention of the international obligations of Haiti.

21. The mandate of the Independent Expert of the Human Rights Council on the situation of human rights in Haiti expired in March 2017 and was not renewed by the Council. Despite repeated calls from my Special Representative, the Independent Expert and civil society organizations, the Government has yet to assign the human rights portfolio to a specific ministry. The term of the Ombudsperson, the State's independent human rights defender, ended in September 2016, with no replacement appointed to date, despite some progress in the recruitment process since its launch in February 2017. MINUSTAH released its annual report on the human rights situation in Haiti on 3 July 2017, covering the period from 1 July 2015 to 31 December 2016. The report highlighted a high number of arbitrary arrests, cruel and inhumane treatment in detention facilities and a lack of accountability that emboldens impunity.

E. Humanitarian and development

22. In March, a mission of the Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Emergency Director Group reviewed the effectiveness of the humanitarian response in Haiti. The mission made recommendations to the humanitarian country team and the Government on how to improve the effectiveness of the humanitarian architecture in place, enhance coordination between humanitarian and development actors and develop a more strategic approach to protection. As at 19 May, 2.35 million people in Haiti were severely food-insecure and in need of immediate assistance, while more than 143,110 were estimated to be suffering from acute malnutrition. Since Hurricane Matthew struck in October 2016, 1,273 households, or 4,200 people, have remained housed in temporary shelters. The humanitarian community is engaging the Government to develop a strategy for assisting the affected people in leaving those shelters in a safe and voluntary manner. In the most affected departments, Grand' Anse, Nippes and South, low funding levels have impeded the scaling-up of the humanitarian response to food, shelter, health and protection needs. With crop losses reaching 80 to 100 per cent in rural areas, food insecurity stands to increase in the coming months if urgent measures are not taken to resume farming by mid-November.

23. As at 31 May 2017, the International Organization for Migration had registered 192,685 people who had returned from the Dominican Republic since June 2015. Those arriving in Haiti continue to find themselves in a situation of vulnerability owing to the insufficient reception capacity of the Haitian authorities and a lack of reintegration opportunities. This group will likely continue to need assistance in the foreseeable future, including with regard to the determination of their legal status. Coordination between the United Nations country teams in Haiti and the Dominican Republic has allowed for effective responses to the needs of affected people as well as for preparedness and contingency planning. Since the 2010 earthquake, 46,691 persons have remained internally displaced in 31 camps without access to durable solutions.

24. As at 10 June 2017, 7,113 suspected cases of cholera and 83 related deaths had been reported, in comparison with the 18,486 suspected cases and 173 deaths reported for the same period in 2016. As indicated in my second report on the new approach to cholera in Haiti (A/71/895), the intensified cholera response carried out by rapid-deployment mobile teams, including a vaccination campaign benefiting more than 800,000 persons, mostly in hurricane-affected areas, has resulted in a significant decline in the number of suspected cholera cases. Securing the necessary

funding for the ongoing efforts of the Government and its international partners to contain and eradicate cholera will be critical to sustaining the positive progress made so far in 2017.

25. During the reporting period, more than 86,000 individuals living with HIV, 62 per cent of them women, received antiretroviral medication. With United Nations support, the Ministry of Health conducted a nationwide poll in support of eliminating stigma and discrimination relating to HIV and continued its efforts to eliminate mother-to-child transmission of the virus by 2020.

26. Low international oil prices constrained concessional financing through the Petrocaribe agreement, while public investment contracted by 20 per cent and private investment remained slow. As a result of recent interventions in the foreign exchange market by the central bank of Haiti and an increase in remittances, the Haitian gourde appreciated, rising in value from 70 to 63.7 against 1 United States dollar, during the first quarter of 2017. Measures announced at the beginning of the fiscal year, aimed at bolstering the capacity of the State institutions to apply its tax policy and boost revenue, were not fully implemented. The poor financial performance of the State-owned electricity authority and the delayed decision to implement the automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism continued to constrain the narrow public resource envelope. The fiscal deficit, however, is expected to be approximately 2.5 per cent of gross domestic product by the end of the current fiscal year, down from the 5 per cent initially projected, owing to lower spending related to post-hurricane recovery and reconstruction efforts.

27. In May, the annual visit of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti of the Economic and Social Council examined ways to strengthen the partnership between the Government and the international community in support of the country's economic recovery and development. The United Nations country team met with the Government and civil society representatives to validate the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for the period 2017-2021 before its signature on 30 June 2017. Discussions with the Prime Minister on United Nations support for the Government's development priorities are ongoing, following a meeting held on 2 May with the country team.

28. As at 22 May, MINUSTAH had disbursed $2,994,873.54 of the $3 million quick-impact project budget for the fiscal year 2016/17, implementing 57 of 60 planned projects, which benefited 2,000,569 people, including 1,040,296 women. Projects were focused primarily on the rule of law, good governance, public infrastructure and the provision of potable water to prevent water-borne diseases, including cholera.

III. Transition of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

A. Mission drawdown planning

29. Pursuant to resolution 2350 (2017), MINUSTAH began the implementation of a comprehensive withdrawal plan encompassing its military, police and civilian components, with the objective of fully withdrawing 2,370 troops and reducing the police component to the levels authorized for MINUJUSTH, while significantly reducing its geographical and staffing footprint, before its closure on 15 October. Throughout the drawdown process, my Special Representative and other members of the MINUSTAH leadership team have consulted with the Government at all levels, including the President and the Prime Minister, to ensure the progressive transfer of tasks to the Haitian authorities, where appropriate.

1. Military component

30. Following the adoption of resolution 2350 (2017), MINUSTAH began to implement the first phase of a staggered military drawdown. Accordingly, on 15 April the Chilean aviation unit and the Chilean and joint Uruguayan-Peruvian battalions ceased operations in the northern part of Haiti, with Brazilian troops providing security for the vacated camps. Certain key tasks, including security analysis and patrols in sensitive areas, were gradually transferred to the national police with the support of MINUSTAH police. On 15 June, the military component completed the handover to the national police of security tasks in the fragile commune of Cité Soleil in Port-au-Prince, in close coordination with the MINUSTAH police component. Before the handover, the three forces had doubled their joint patrols in the area.

31. The next phase saw the ceasing of operations of the Guatemalan company on 10 June, while the Philippine company will cease operations on 15 July. The full repatriation of the two companies is planned for July and August, respectively. Between 15 April and 30 June, the military component's engineering units prepared 9 of the 65 MINUSTAH camps for closure and handover to the Government and private property owners.

32. By 10 July, MINUSTAH had withdrawn a total of 956 military personnel, reducing the strength of the component to 1,413 personnel, who are concentrated in Port-au-Prince. The remaining troops, comprising one infantry battalion, two engineering companies, medical and aviation units and a force headquarters, will focus primarily on camp closures while continuing long-range patrols and quick-reaction force exercises throughout the country, if needed. The final withdrawal of the military component will start on 15 August with the ceasing of operations of the Argentinian military hospital, followed by the ceasing of operations, on 1 September, of the Brazilian contingents, the Paraguayan engineering company and the Bangladeshi aviation unit. The force headquarters will remain operational after the repatriation of the last troops, which is planned for 1 to 5 October, until the last day of the MINUSTAH mandate.

2. Police component

33. MINUSTAH leadership consulted closely with the Government and high-level commanding officers of the national police to ensure that adequate security arrangements were being put in place, in particular in those geographical and functional areas from which the Mission's troops and police are withdrawing. New arrangements include strategic planning for the deployment of newly graduated officers of the twenty-seventh promotion of the Haitian National Police and its crowd control units in crime-prone and volatile regions of the country.

34. Taking into account the key objectives of the Haitian National Police strategic development plan for the period 2017-2021, MINUSTAH undertook a mapping exercise, identifying areas from which the United Nations police will disengage, which will require an active role on the part of the national police and continued support from international partners, including the United Nations country team. One such role is currently being piloted in the North region, namely, a co-location model in which individual MINUSTAH police officers work together with their national police counterparts at a senior level, providing hands-on operational support and mentoring guidance, directly transferring skills and capacities aimed at ensuring longer-term sustainability. A lessons-learned exercise to be undertaken jointly with the national police to further calibrate the approach on the basis of early results will permit the model to be applied at 17 regional offices and in Port-au-Prince under MINUJUSTH.

35. As the reduction from 11 to 7 formed police units and from 951 to 295 individual police officers began, MINUSTAH repatriated 1 Bangladeshi formed police unit comprising 125 elements and 116 individual police officers during the reporting period, reducing the strength of the component to 1,527 formed police unit personnel and 635 individual police officers. In addition, 19 of the 43 police co-location sites were closed. The remaining 474 formed police unit personnel, belonging to the three Pakistani, one Jordanian and three Indian units, will be repatriated in mid-August, while the remaining 340 individual police officers will be separated between July and October.

3. Civilian component

36. On the basis of the identified critical functions and minimum capacity required for focused mandate delivery during the drawdown of MINUSTAH, a monthly civilian drawdown plan was developed. The plan safeguards core mandated areas that will be retained as part of the focus of MINUJUSTH on good offices, the rule of law, human rights and support for police development, and adequate mission support capacities to facilitate the closure and liquidation of MINUSTAH. On 30 June, 317 of 1,346 posts were separated from MINUSTAH. Further reductions in civilian staff will be effected on a monthly basis from July through September, at which point 614 staff will remain before being separated by 15 October.

37. The Mission's geographical footprint was significantly reduced with the ceasing of operations of the regional offices in Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes on 30 June and the related ceasing of civilian functions at the departmental level. Furthermore, 26 of the Mission's 65 sites scheduled for closure, including 4 military and police camps and 19 police co-locations, were closed. All sites are being closed in compliance with United Nations environmental management guidance. In keeping with internal rules and regulations, an asset disposal plan has been developed, classifying MINUSTAH assets into five disposal categories, including redeployment to other missions, sale to the United Nations country team or donation in support of the rehabilitation of the country.

38. MINUSTAH is supporting national staff in their search for employment following their separation from the Mission, including through the organization of a job fair on 28 June, engaging private and public sector actors, diplomatic missions and international organizations, and the holding of targeted capacity-building workshops, for example, on entrepreneurship.

B. Joint transition plan of the United Nations Mission Stabilization Mission in Haiti and the United Nations country team

39. In parallel to the Mission's drawdown, MINUSTAH and the United Nations country team finalized and adopted a joint transition plan. Guided by resolution 2350 (2017), and on the basis of an institutional capacity assessment, a risk analysis and the work carried out under the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, the transition plan is the result of a comprehensive planning process that began in 2014/15 through the establishment of joint thematic groups in which MINUSTAH and the country team identified common objectives in the areas of the rule of law, police development, human rights, gender and governance. The plan identifies stabilization needs and priority objectives for Haiti and, accordingly, areas for continued United Nations engagement as well as areas from which MINUSTAH is disengaging. It describes critical peacebuilding gaps that will result from the withdrawal of MINUSTAH and that will require continued support from MINUJUSTH as well as the country team and the donor community.

40. Activities from which peacekeeping in Haiti has initiated its progressive disengagement include: subnational governance, including support for decentralized bodies and local government; operational electoral support; border management; legislative drafting and capacity-building; the training of national authorities on child protection issues; juvenile justice; and policing areas, such as traffic control, maritime patrolling, anti-kidnapping efforts, vetting activities, civil protection and close protection. Strong government leadership and increased support from international partners, including the United Nations country team, will be vital to preserving the progress made thus far in these areas.

41. The plan also includes a public communications strategy that was continuously implemented throughout the reporting period, with strategic media engagement and outreach undertaken by my Special Representative and the senior leadership of the Mission and the United Nations country team. Raising awareness regarding the closure of MINUSTAH and the transition to a new configuration of the United Nations presence in Haiti, namely, MINUJUSTH and the United Nations country team, will remain critical in the next reporting period.

IV. Planning for the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti

A. Overview and strategic objectives

42. Planning for the establishment of MINUJUSTH, in line with the mandate parameters set out in resolution 2350 (2017), is well under way, under the auspices of a Haiti planning team based in New York. The planning team will continue to fulfil its role of MINUJUSTH advance team, envisaged in the resolution, until the first appointments of MINUJUSTH leadership have been made. Among the several assessment visits to Haiti that have been carried out since the adoption of the resolution, which have targeted various aspects of planning, the United Nations Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and Other Crisis Situations team visited Haiti from 8 to 22 May to help develop the priorities and objectives of MINUJUSTH and the country team in the area of the rule of law and to contribute to the development of a strategy for supporting the transition to development actors. The Global Focal Point assessment took place in close cooperation with the Government of Haiti, which designated three senior officials to co-lead, from the Haitian National Police, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Directorate of Prison Administration.

43. The link between chronic stability challenges, on the one hand, and challenges in the rule of law and human rights, on the other, as identified by the strategic assessment mission in February and the Global Focal Point visit in May, has provided the main premise for MINUJUSTH planning in the three key areas of its mandate: justice and corrections, police development and human rights. Building on the achievements of MINUSTAH, MINUJUSTH will seek to address residual deficiencies in the judicial and corrections systems, which continue to suffer from chronic politicization, lack of accountability, limited access to justice for citizens and high rates of prolonged pretrial detention, and which feed into the public perception that violence and corruption are more effective means of addressing grievances than the law. MINUJUSTH will focus on further strengthening the operational and administrative capacity of the Haitian National Police and its compliance with international human rights standards, particularly with respect to the use of force and arrest and detention, so that it can gradually, and autonomously, assume responsibility for the provision of security and the effective protection of the population throughout the country, including from sexual and gender-based

violence. MINUJUSTH will also seek to strengthen the capacity of civil society and national institutions mandated to independently monitor human rights violations, and will further advocate against impunity so that those oversight institutions will play a more effective role of watchdog with respect to the Constitution.

44. Mindful of a two-year mandate horizon, MINUJUSTH will target and prioritize its interventions within two broad strategic objectives: improving the accountability and human rights compliance of relevant institutions and improving their professionalism and efficiency. In that regard, appropriate benchmarks, based on a realistic assessment of MINUJUSTH achievements expected by the end of 2019, will be presented in my initial report to the Security Council following the entry into force of the Mission's mandate. Another key strategic objective of MINUJUSTH will be to support the maintenance of a safe and secure environment through continued operational support for the Haitian National Police following the withdrawal of the MINUSTAH military component. Furthermore, a strategy for gradually transferring MINUJUSTH functions to local institutions, where appropriate, and building the capacities and resources of the United Nations country team for supporting residual rule of law and human rights needs in the country will form an integral part of all MINUJUSTH areas of intervention, supporting the Mission's exit strategy. The development of a new, joint programme between MINUJUSTH and the country team, anchored in national plans, will offer a longer-term vision and a vehicle for closer cooperation and transition, as well as a means for resource mobilization in areas of increasing engagement by non-peacekeeping partners.

45. As an overall outcome, by the end of its mandate MINUJUSTH will seek to significantly improve the trust of all sectors of society in the rule of law and in the institutional checks and balances of democracy so that they can be broadly supported by all Haitians as important factors for longer-term stability and economic development. It is also expected that, by the end of 2019, MINUJUSTH will have ensured the seamless transition of residual peacebuilding tasks in the areas of the rule of law and human rights to the country team and other bilateral partners, as part of a longer-term United Nations commitment to sustaining peace and promoting development in the country.

B. Operations

46. In accordance with its mandate, MINUJUSTH will support and strengthen the accountability and oversight mechanisms in the justice sector, the Superior Council of the Judiciary and the Inspection Unit of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, so that those bodies can more effectively carry out their primary functions, namely, providing recommendations for the appointment and extension of judges and prosecutors, as well as holding such officials to account for poor performance, misconduct or human rights violations. MINUJUSTH will also advocate the completion of key legislative reform processes, especially those underpinning the functioning of the criminal justice system (the penal and criminal procedure codes, the law on legal aid and the prison law), strengthening institutional functioning (the review of the electoral legal framework) and promoting gender equality and action against sexual and gender-based violence (the gender equality bill and the law on the prevention, punishment and eradication of violence against women). In improving the concept of model jurisdictions implemented by MINUSTAH, MINUJUSTH will provide dedicated capacity-building and advisory support for the effective functioning of the police, criminal defence and justice and corrections institutions in one selected jurisdiction, with particular emphasis placed on improving Haitian ownership. It is hoped that successful results in that jurisdiction

will serve as a catalyst for improvement in other jurisdictions throughout Haiti, targeting a significant decrease in the percentage of criminal suspects held in pretrial detention for more than two years, as well as in the number of suspects held in police holding cells for more than 48 hours, contrary to Haitian law.

47. Corrections experts of MINUJUSTH, including government-provided personnel, will mentor and transfer expertise to senior-level officers of the Directorate of Prison Administration by supporting the certification by the latter of 9 of the 19 prisons in Haiti as capable of operating without full-time MINUJUSTH or other international support. MINUJUSTH will provide targeted support for the implementation of the Directorate's strategic development plan for the period 2017-2021 in terms of organizational development; the security and improvement of detention conditions; gender-responsive administration and management; and the rehabilitation and reintegration of inmates, including the strengthening of its autonomy in the management of its budget. MINUJUSTH will also support the Directorate, in coordination with Haitian National Police leadership, in developing and implementing a targeted recruitment and training road map aimed at increasing the number of its personnel from the current 1,649 to 2,349, including 33 per cent women, by 2021.

48. The human rights component of MINUJUSTH, in addition to cooperating with other components in strengthening the national accountability structures in the rule of law sector, will focus on strengthening the capacity of the national human rights institution, the Ombudsperson's office (the Office of Citizen Protection), in operating as a reliable human rights accountability mechanism vis-a-vis all State institutions. It will support the Ombudsperson in effectively and independently investigating systematic human rights violations and carrying out public reporting functions, in order to promote and protect the rights of all Haitian citizens, including women's rights, non-discrimination and equality. MINUJUSTH will provide technical assistance and support for the capacity of civil society with regard to advocacy and reporting to human rights mechanisms, while also supporting the adoption of a plan of action for the Government's implementation of the recommendations of such mechanisms, including those relating to impunity of past administrations.

49. MINUJUSTH will maintain a focus on the institutional and professional development of the Haitian National Police, within the framework of the Haitian National Police strategic development plan for the period 2017-2021. Focusing on a number of key priorities, the Mission will provide professional expertise to senior and midlevel management of the national police, through supervisory mentoring and strategic advice on leadership, investigation skills, gender mainstreaming and efforts to address sexual and gender-based violence. Mentoring and assistance will also be provided by civilian experts with specialized profiles to build capacities in police administration, in particular in the areas of reform and restructuring, planning, human resources, information and facilities management, transport, logistics, engineering, telecommunications, and budget and finance. Additional activities will target the development and implementation of community-oriented policing strategies to enable the national police to build greater trust with local communities, and training programmes to help prevent illegal or arbitrary arrest and detention and excessive use of force. Furthermore, MINUJUSTH will promote the effectiveness of the accountability mechanism of the Haitian National Police, its General Inspectorate, with a view to extending its authority beyond Port-au-Prince, as well as swift action to address human rights violations and misconduct cases when disciplinary or other judicial measures need to be applied.

50. The seven formed police units remaining in MINUJUSTH will provide continued operational support to the Haitian National Police in the maintenance of

law and order throughout the country, including for the protection of civilians, within the limits of their capabilities. Such support will be essential in areas outside the capital, where the presence of the national police remains weak, and MINUJUSTH will maintain the capacity to provide it rapidly. The formed police units will conduct joint field patrols with the Haitian National Police to help increase its visibility, both as a deterrent to crime and to build greater confidence in it on the part of the population. Joint patrols and operations are also expected to serve as a means to increase the "on-the-job" skills of national police officers in protecting civilians against threats of physical violence. The provision of operational support to the national police will be aimed at a gradual transition of full responsibility for security tasks to them, harmonized with their gradual build-up, and at ensuring the sustainability of security gains in the country.

51. MINUJUSTH will implement tailored community violence reduction projects to foster local engagement in the rule of law and the work of the Haitian National Police. Such projects will be focused on rule of law issues, ranging from corrections to policing and judicial matters, and supporting community outreach and dialogue through sensitization campaigns, including town halls, debates and workshops, in fragile areas throughout Haiti These community-based projects will to help raise awareness of key reform initiatives and ensure that local needs and concerns relating to security and socioeconomic issues are at the forefront of political discussions.

52. A United Nations electoral needs assessment mission, deployed to Haiti from 29 May to 2 June, provided recommendations on the holding of elections and proposed possible future United Nations support in that regard. The needs assessment mission observed that it was essential that United Nations electoral assistance be continued, in a manner aligned with the current transition context, in order to sustain and build on the results of the more than 13 years of such support provided in Haiti by MINUSTAH. The mission recommended that MINUJUSTH continue to support electoral institutional reform within its rule of law and good offices mandate, aimed at the establishment of the Permanent Electoral Council and the completion of the electoral legal framework. The next two years, during which no electoral events are expected to be held, represent a unique window of opportunity for addressing these key matters. Under current transition planning, future technical support for electoral processes is to be provided by the United Nations country team.

C. Political strategy

53. Lessons learned from the work carried out by MINUSTAH on the rule of law over the past 13 years have highlighted the need for close links between the political strategies of the United Nations and its support for rule of law reform, in order to promote results. In that context, and in the light of the recommendation of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations regarding the primacy of politics in peacekeeping, the political and operational strategies of the Mission form a close nexus with its political and good offices mandate and efforts, in direct support of its rule of law and human rights mandate. To that end, the substantive structure of the Mission will also be centred on a joint political and rule of law pillar, working closely with both the police and human rights pillars, thus ensuring an adequate level of synergy and common strategic intent and maximizing the impact of a relatively light footprint.

54. In pursuing those and other strategic objectives, MINUJUSTH, through its political leadership, will employ its good offices role vis-à-vis the executive and legislative branches. In order to extend its political leverage beyond the capital, the

Mission will play an early warning and monitoring role, together with a political outreach and advocacy role, vis-à-vis key sectors of the society and local decision makers at the regional level. This will be achieved through the mobile deployment of joint political, justice, corrections and human rights experts to the nine regions outside Port-au-Prince on a weekly basis and will make use of the coordinated community violence reduction outreach and sensitization programme.

55. The success of MINUJUSTH will depend in large part on its ability to quickly develop a relationship of partnership, mutual understanding and cooperation with the Government on priority challenges that need to be addressed in the country. The planning for MINUJUSTH so far reflects a shared vision with key government stakeholders in the areas of its mandate. However, continuous engagement will be sought by the leadership of both MINUSTAH and MINUJUSTH in order to ensure further refinement of those priorities in the coming months and a continuous commitment on the part of the Government to supporting the implementation of such priorities in the future. In that regard, it will be for my Special Representative for MINUJUSTH, once appointed, to pursue discussions with the Government on a possible cooperation framework, based on mutual priorities and mutual accountability, which should also be closely linked to the identification of benchmarks for the fulfilment of the Mission's mandate.

D. Footprint and support issues

56. MINUJUSTH will have a considerably lighter footprint than MINUSTAH, with a reduction of more than 75 per cent in civilian staffing levels. All civilian components, including substantive, support and security, will be based in Port-au-Prince and equipped with the mobility necessary to address needs in the regions. In accordance with the human resources strategy for international civilian staff to be selected from rosters and a similar competitive process for national civilian staff, recruitment for MINUJUSTH is being carried out in three stages, with the first already in progress, targeting leadership posts.

57. The police component of MINUJUSTH will be ready and operational on 16 October 2017, through the drawdown and reconfiguration of the MINUSTAH police component, which are already under way. The 295 individual police officers and an additional number of contracted civilian police experts will be co-located at 17 Haitian National Police facilities in the capital and at all 10 of the regional administrative headquarters of the national police. Of the seven formed police units, including one with an embedded special weapons and tactics (SWAT) capacity, three will be based in Port-au-Prince (the West region) and the other four in the Nord, Artibonite, Nippes and Grand' Anse regions.

58. The concept of operations for MINUJUSTH police implies the need for air and ground mobility so that formed police units and SWAT personnel can rapidly deploy from their five locations to support Haitian National Police operations and protect civilians throughout Haiti, including United Nations personnel and assets. A procurement process initiated in May for the deployment of two commercial helicopters will prevent a gap in air capacity following the departure of MINUSTAH military air assets in mid-August. While the option of retaining these commercial helicopters in MINUJUSTH remains, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is also approaching Member States with a request for police helicopters, which are not limited in the transportation of certain types of crowd control equipment for use in emergency situations.

59. The Department of Safety and Security is working with the designated official and the United Nations country team to reconfigure the United Nations security

management system structure in Haiti. Given the reduced number of locations and uniformed elements countrywide, a more centralized approach is being designed. In that regard, enhanced host country security support is being sought to facilitate United Nations activity across Haiti, particularly in areas and regions where the rapid deployment of MINUJUSTH formed police units to provide protection for United Nations staff may face logistical challenges.

V. Conduct and discipline

60. MINUSTAH strengthened the task force on protection from sexual exploitation and abuse through the development of a communications strategy with the United Nations country team and non-governmental organizations to advise the public on United Nations standards of conduct. It has also increased coordination with partners to identify available resources for the provision of assistance to victims of misconduct, and has been meeting with the local population to inform them of complaint reporting procedures and measures to protect victims, witnesses and family members.

VI. Financial aspects

61. The General Assembly, by its resolution 71/302, authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the maintenance of the Mission in a total amount not exceeding $90 million for the period from 1 July 2017 to 31 December 2017.

62. As at 6 July 2017, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINUSTAH amounted to $56.7 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $1,462.6 million.

63. Reimbursement of troop and formed police costs has been made for the period up to 30 April 2017, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 31 March 2017, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

VII. Observations

64. With the installation of the Government and of nearly all directly elected officials at all levels of the governance system of Haiti, and the completion of the first 100 days of the new administration, the country appears to be on a steady path towards institutional and political stability. I am encouraged by the adoption of a government road map that places emphasis on accountability and transparency while at the same time fighting against corruption. I also welcome the adoption of a joint legislative agenda by the executive branch and the legislature. This sets the stage for strengthened and constructive collaboration between those two branches of power, which is necessary for the implementation of an ambitious reform agenda, as outlined by President Moïse.

65. The launch of a special parliamentary commission to assess the Constitution could provide the framework for efforts to promote further progress in the country. I reiterate my encouragement to President Moïse to move forward with the broad-based national dialogue, which he announced earlier this year with the objective of forging a common vision based on reform priorities that address the most pressing socioeconomic and political challenges. I also encourage the inclusion of electoral reform in this agenda, with a view to further strengthening the national capacity to

administer and manage elections in Haiti without resorting to international assistance.

66. For the further consolidation of the democracy and continued development of Haiti, it is now essential that the independence of the judiciary, the third branch of government, be fully restored and assured. I therefore call on the relevant national authorities to take swift steps to fill key positions in the judiciary through a transparent and merit-based selection process. I also call attention to the continued need for measures to reduce women's vulnerability and guarantee their meaningful participation in decision-making. In addition, I welcome the Government's continued prioritization of the institutional development of the national police, which should be accompanied by the provision of adequate financial resources and the implementation of the newly articulated Haitian National Police strategic development plan for the period 2017-2021.

67. Tangible progress in the area of the rule of law is critical for the creation of conditions conducive to private investments, which can help to reverse the downward economic trends. It is important that all actors, including the State, political parties, the private sector and civil society, help to address social tensions and work together to deliver socioeconomic progress that responds to the expectations of the Haitian people.

68. While I note that the mandate of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti was not extended, I welcome the continued engagement by Haiti with other international mechanisms, such as treaty bodies and thematic special procedures. I encourage the Government, the national human rights institution and civil society to continue to engage with the human rights component of MINUJUSTH to strengthen the promotion and protection of human rights in Haiti.

69. I am encouraged by the reduction in the number of cholera cases and deaths reported, despite the impact of Hurricane Matthew in 2016, which could have had devastating consequences. It is essential that our joint efforts with the Government of Haiti to curb and contain the epidemic be sustained and that adequate funding be secured. To that end, I have appointed Josette Sheeran of the United States as my Special Envoy for Haiti to guide the full implementation of the new United Nations approach to cholera in Haiti and support national efforts to implement the 2030 sustainable development goals of Haiti.

70. MINUSTAH, while implementing a gradual drawdown, has remained equally focused on implementing critical aspects of its mandate during its last months. I commend all staff of the Mission, international and national, who are working in a committed manner for the successful implementation of its priorities, including through a responsible transition, until the last days of the mandate. I am also pleased that the security transition, through a gradual drawdown of the police component and the departure of MINUSTAH military units, has so far proceeded in a smooth manner, reinforcing indications that Haiti is ready to address challenges to its stable, yet fragile, security environment without a military presence. Such progress notwithstanding, the seven formed police units that will remain in MINUJUSTH will be prepared to provide operational support to the Haitian National Police until it reaches a number of key additional milestones in its institutional development.

71. Planning for MINUJUSTH reflects the two-year horizon for the completion of the peacekeeping phase of the United Nations engagement in Haiti, envisaged in resolution 2350 (2017). Accordingly, it sets targeted but realistic objectives for MINUJUSTH in its role in strengthening the rule of law, the police and human rights in Haiti, given the link between weaknesses in those areas and the recurrence of instability in the country throughout the years. At the same time, it reflects a

strategy of incremental transition, so that the country team gradually takes up residual peacebuilding tasks and local actors gradually assume full responsibility in areas from which peacekeeping will disengage, in continuation of the MINUSTAH-United Nations country team transition strategy. This will require that the bilateral partners of Haiti also step up and optimize their support, in order to ensure that no resource or capacity gaps are left unaddressed in the process of implementing that transition.

72. MINUJUSTH will seek to maximize its political leverage and good offices role, in order to increase the effectiveness of its targeted interventions in the areas of justice, police, corrections and human rights. It is hoped that this new approach, of closely linking technical expertise with political engagement, will create the political space necessary for reforms in areas where political interests have delayed progress throughout the MINUSTAH mandate. MINUJUSTH operations are also being designed to ensure maximum synergies between different substantive areas, cutting across different mission components, aimed at the implementation of a holistic strategic vision.

73. In the light of the advanced level of planning already undertaken to establish the new mission, I am confident that MINUJUSTH will be operational on 16 October 2017, the first day of its mandate. In the meantime, the United Nations will continue to engage with Haitian stakeholders and other partners in further developing and refining the concept of the Mission and ensuring appropriate synergies and alignment of efforts. I therefore invite the Haitian stakeholders to strengthen their engagement with the MINUSTAH leadership and the MINUJUSTH advance team in order to consolidate a joint vision on the priorities and objectives of the Mission and the wider United Nations presence, especially on rule of law reform, as well as a joint road map for their implementation. The reform agenda of Haiti can be achieved only when committed Haitian counterparts own it and take the necessary steps to effect change.

74. In the same vein, I welcome the support provided by the Security Council during its recent visit to Haiti, from 22 to 24 June, which underscored the high level of international commitment to Haiti, its Government and its people, and also demonstrated the continued United Nations engagement in the country's stability, development and institutional strengthening in the areas of the rule of law and human rights. The visit also provided an opportunity for government counterparts and civil society and private sector interlocutors to express their concerns and expectations with respect to the reconfiguration of the United Nations presence and the transition to MINUJUSTH.

75. In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude to my Special Representative for Haiti, Sandra Honoré, for her invaluable contributions to the stability of Haiti, as well as to all remaining and departing MINUSTAH civilian staff and uniformed personnel, for their unwavering commitment to achieving the Mission's mandate. I am equally grateful to the United Nations country team and other partners, who are continuing their close cooperation with MINUSTAH as it draws down and are preparing to step up their role in the next phase of United Nations engagement in the country.

Annex I

Composition and strength of the police of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti as at 16 June 2017

	United Nations police officers		*Formed police units*	
Country	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*
Argentina		9		
Bangladesh	1	18	81	218
Benin		32		
Brazil		2		
Burkina Faso	1	25		
Cameroon	9	5		
Canada	8	50		
Chad		2		
Chile		2		
Colombia	7	30		
Djibouti		5		
El Salvador	2	25		
Ethiopia		8		
France		1		
Germany	1	2		
Ghana	1	9		
Guinea		4		
India		12		440
Indonesia	5	8		
Jordan		33		318
Madagascar	5	31		
Mali	2	36		
Nepal		17	13	127
Niger	9	69		
Nigeria	1	2		
Norway	3	3		
Pakistan				140
Philippines	1	11		
Portugal		1		
Romania	1	13		
Russian Federation	1	8		
Rwanda	1	9	21	139
Senegal		14	14	143
Slovakia	1	5		
Sweden	5	5		
Serbia		4		
Togo	21	9		
Tunisia		11		

	United Nations police officers		*Formed police units*	
Country	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*
Turkey		17		
United States of America	2	13		
Uruguay		4		
Yemen		2		
	88	566	129	1 525
Total		**654**		**1 654**
				2 308

Annex II

Countries providing military staff and contingents to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti as at 28 June 2017

	Staff officers		*Troops*		
Country	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Total*
Argentina		6	25	41	72
Bangladesh		2	2	108	112
Brazil[a]		9	19	951	979
Canada	1	5			6
Chile		3	4	50	57
Ecuador		1			1
El Salvador				1	1
Guatemala		2		4	6
Jordan		3			3
Mexico		1			1
Nepal		3			3
Paraguay		1	5	77	83
Peru		3			3
Philippines		2	14	121	137
Sri Lanka		3			3
United States of America		3			3
Uruguay		6			6
Total	**1**	**53**	**69**	**1 353**	**1 476**

[a] The Force Commander is employed on a United Nations contract and hence is not reflected in the troop strength.

Map No. 4224 Rev. 49 UNITED NATIONS
July 2017

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

United Nations S/2017/605

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 July 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 12 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am writing to you with reference to the attached list of letters from the Syrian regime's representative (see annex).

Turkey categorically refutes the spurious allegations contained in those and other letters to the same effect. They are, yet again, futile efforts aimed at distorting reality and undermining the documented facts regarding the atrocities committed by the regime, which amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The regime, which lost its legitimacy long ago, is the very root cause of all the problems emanating from the Syrian conflict and will be held accountable for its crimes.

As underlined in our previous letters addressed to the Security Council, Turkey will not hesitate to exercise its inherent right of self-defence as outlined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations in response to threats to its national security.

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feridun H. **Sinirlioğlu**
Permanent Representative

17-11827 (E) 170717

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Annex to the letter dated 12 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

List of letters

- Letter dated 11 July 2017 (PM/2017/255)
- Letter dated 11 July 2017, issued as document S/2017/595
- Letter dated 7 July 2017 (PM/2017/251)
- Letter dated 6 July 2017 (PM/2017/248)
- Letter dated 6 July 2017, issued as document S/2017/582
- Letter dated 6 July 2017 (PM/2017/244)
- Letter dated 5 July 2017 (PM/2017/242)
- Letter dated 3 July 2017 (PM/2017/238)
- Letter dated 26 June 2017, issued as document S/2017/545
- Letter dated 30 May 2017 (PM/2017/201)
- Letter dated 29 May 2017, issued as document S/2017/459
- Letter dated 28 May 2017, issued as document S/2017/458
- Letter dated 27 May 2017, issued as document S/2017/457
- Letter dated 9 May 2017 (PM/2017/169)
- Letter dated 26 April 2017, issued as document S/2017/364
- Letter dated 26 April 2017 (PM/2017/154)
- Letter dated 25 April 2017, issued as document S/2017/352
- Letter dated 16 April 2017, issued as document S/2017/327
- Letter dated 4 April 2017, issued as document S/2017/281
- Letter dated 3 April 2017, issued as document S/2017/280
- Letter dated 30 March 2017, issued as document S/2017/267
- Letter dated 23 March 2017, issued as document S/2017/246

United Nations S/2017/606

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 July 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 11 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to attach herewith the press statement issued by the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Sudan on 10 July 2017, in which it welcomes the statement issued by the United Nations country team in the Sudan on the marked improvement of humanitarian access in the country (see annex).

In its statement, the country team confirmed the following:

The revision of the Government of the Sudan's Directives and Procedures for Humanitarian Action in December 2016 has allowed for improvements in the scope and quality of humanitarian access. Recent months have seen United Nations agencies and partners increasingly working in areas that were previously inaccessible, to carry out needs assessments and provide humanitarian assistance. Notable areas of increased access include parts of the Jebel Marra region in Darfur, some of which had remained inaccessible to humanitarian actors for the past seven years.

(*Signed*) Omer Dahab Fadl **Mohamed**
Permanent Representative

17-11958 (E) 180717 180717

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Annex to the letter dated 11 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Information Department

Press statement

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomes the statement that the United Nations country team in the Sudan issued on Monday, 10 July 2017. In that statement, the country team expressed its hopes for a positive decision on the lifting of the American sanctions that have been imposed on the Sudan. The Ministry expresses its satisfaction that the facts and evidence contained in the statement confirmed that the Sudan and the international community are cooperating closely with regard to humanitarian matters at the regional and international levels.

The Ministry greatly appreciates the constructive tone of the statement and reiterates that the Government of the Sudan welcomes the American proposal to deliver humanitarian assistance to the Two Areas, particularly given the heightened confidence and optimism that was engendered by the decision of the President of the Republic to extend the unilateral ceasefire and in view of the continued provision of humanitarian assistance by official and civilian State institutions to their brethren in South Sudan.

The Ministry takes this opportunity to reiterate that the Government of the Sudan is determined and committed to continuing and enhancing its cooperation with the United Nations and all humanitarian partners. It will make every effort to achieve lasting peace and sustained development in the country and work diligently with regional and international partners to maintain international peace and security.

Issued on 10 July 2017

Ambassador Qaribullah **Khidr**
Official spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic]

Statement attributable to the United Nations Country Team in Sudan

United Nations Hopes for Positive Decision on US Sanctions Relief

Khartoum, 10 July 2017. The United Nations Country Team (UNCT) in Sudan acknowledges that there has been a marked improvement in humanitarian access over the past six months, since Executive Order 13761 was signed on 13 January 2017, as a result of improved engagement between the Government of Sudan and humanitarian actors. The revision of the Government of Sudan's Directives and Procedures for Humanitarian Action in December 2016 has allowed for improvements in the scope and quality of humanitarian access. Recent months have seen UN agencies and partners increasingly working in areas that were previously inaccessible, to carry out needs assessments and provide humanitarian assistance. Notable areas of increased access include parts of the Jebel Marra region in Darfur, some of which had remained inaccessible to humanitarian actors for the past seven years.

While full humanitarian access remains a challenge in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states — particularly in areas under the control of armed groups, which remain inaccessible — UN agencies and partners are now able to provide humanitarian assistance in a number of government-controlled areas which were previously blocked. This has allowed essential assistance to reach previously underserved communities, including assistance in health, food, nutrition, water, sanitation, child protection, education and mine action. In response to the declaration of famine in parts of South Sudan in February 2017, the UNCT has worked closely with the Government of Sudan to support South Sudanese refugees inside Sudan, as well as to establish and operationalise three humanitarian corridors, facilitating the delivery of essential food aid to South Sudan.

Improved engagement between humanitarian actors and the Government of Sudan has recently led to agreement on a set of positive reforms to recruitment procedures for INGOs, increasing their operational independence in the country. The UNCT has also observed increased acceptance for national NGOs working in the field, as well as increased engagement of civil society and the private sector on humanitarian issues.

While the UNCT recognises that regulatory improvements can take time to fully materialise on the ground, and that some issues remain to be addressed, the past months have clearly shown that constructive engagement is the best way to maintain the progress already made, as well as to collectively resolve pending issues.

The UNCT looks forward to the decision that will shortly be taken on the sanctions, and is committed to continue its engagement in order to further improve humanitarian access.

United Nations S/2017/607

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 July 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 11 July 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey herewith a report of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the status of the implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya (see annex). The report, dated 23 June 2017, covers the period from 23 May to 22 June 2017.

The report was prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-52/DEC.1 of 20 July 2016 and Security Council resolution 2298 (2016) of 22 July 2016, for transmission to the Security Council.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

17-11963 (E) 170717

Please recycle

Annex

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled "Status of the implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya", prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-52/DEC.1, dated 20 July 2016, and United Nations Security Council resolution 2298 (2016), dated 22 July 2016, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 23 May to 22 June 2017 and also covers the reporting requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-52/DEC.2, dated 27 July 2016, and EC-M-53/DEC.1, dated 26 August 2016.

(*Signed*) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Report of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Status of the implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya

1. At its Fifty-Second Meeting, the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") adopted a decision on the "Destruction of Libya's Remaining Chemical Weapons" (EC-M-52/DEC.1, dated 20 July 2016) and requested the Director-General to assist Libya in developing a modified plan of destruction of Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons. On 22 July 2016, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2298 (2016), welcoming and endorsing the decision by the Council and requesting the Director General, through the Secretary General, to report to the Security Council on a regular basis until the destruction is complete and verified.

2. At the conclusion of its Fifty-Second Meeting, the Council adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Libya's Remaining Category 2 Chemical Weapons" (EC-M-52/DEC.2, dated 27 July 2016). In operative paragraph 17 of that decision, the Council requested the Director-General to report to the Council on a monthly basis on the implementation of the decision. This tenth monthly report covers the period from 23 May to 22 June 2017.

Progress in the elimination of Libyan chemical weapons by the State Party hosting destruction activities

3. Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung von chemischen Kampfstoffen und Rüstungsaltlasten mbH (GEKA mbH), the designated destruction facility at Munster, Germany, completed the destruction of the 2-chloroethanol and tributylamine on 17 December 2016 and 20 January 2017, respectively.

4. As previously reported (EC-85/DG.1, dated 23 March 2017), the destruction of phosphorous trichloride was suspended as a necessary precaution in order to prevent the refractory coating from severe damage. Destruction totals for phosphorous trichloride remain at 3.2 metric tonnes (MT), or 2.8%.

5. Using the incinerator in Incinerator Plant 1 ("Munster 1"), GEKA mbH began the destruction of thionylchloride on 24 March 2017. Feed rates into the incinerator are low, so as to avoid damage to the incinerator. As at 19 June 2017, 9.77 MT, or 9.77%, of the thionylchloride had been destroyed.

6. Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") teams continue to inspect GEKA mbH every two months, with the last such inspection having been conducted from 22 to 24 May 2017. No issues were encountered with the destruction process.

7. GEKA mbH and the Host State have notified the Secretariat that the required permits to alter the destruction technology from incineration to neutralisation have been approved. GEKA mbH anticipates changing from incineration to neutralisation in the first week of July 2017.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to Libya

8. The Secretariat inspected the destruction operations at GEKA mbH between 22 and 24 May 2017. The Secretariat inspection team confirmed that all verification measures were in place and verified the destruction through on-site confirmation and review of video recordings.

9. The next inspection at GEKA mbH is scheduled to take place from 26 to 28 June 2017. The Secretariat will assess the verification procedures for the neutralisation process and confirm the destruction since the last inspection.

10. The Secretariat continues to discuss with GEKA mbH the timelines for the completion of destruction of the remaining chemicals.

11. As previously reported, the Secretariat was informed that during decanting operations at the Ruwagha storage facility, one container experienced an exothermic reaction, causing the material inside to polymerise. Owing to the levels of the Category 2 chemicals remaining in the container (approximately 5%), the viscous nature of the remnants, and the limited ability to recover any usable material, the Secretariat is in a position to affirm that the material no longer presents a proliferation threat.

12. In line with decision EC-M-51/DEC.1 (dated 24 February 2016), the Secretariat has concluded an agreement with the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS) to contract a Libyan firm to complete the destruction of the one remaining tank at the Ruwagha facility. The viscous nature of the material remaining in the tank will require reloading of a partial amount to allow for hydrolysis of the material. Hydrolysis tests were conducted at the OPCW Laboratory on samples obtained from the tank, with a view to providing the correct methodology for destruction.

13. Destruction of the remaining tank is scheduled to begin in the week of 26 June 2017. Destruction operations will be limited to the remaining tank and will not affect the Secretariat's ability to obtain samples from the Ruwagha Tank Farm.

14. The Secretariat, in accordance with the report of the Council at its Eighty-Third Session (paragraph 6.12 of EC-83/5, dated 11 November 2016), continues to consult with the United Nations Office of Safety and Security (UNDSS) as to the possibility of Secretariat personnel travelling to Ruwagha to obtain soil samples. The UNDSS is currently advising against such travel. The Secretariat will continue to monitor the situation.

Overall costs and status of the trust fund

15. On 1 August 2016, the Secretariat issued a Note calling for voluntary contributions to the trust fund for support to Libya (S/1400/2016, dated 1 August 2016). As at the cut off date of this report, the trust fund had received over EUR 1.2 million, with contributions having been received from Canada, Cyprus, Finland, New Zealand, and the United States of America. An additional EUR 133,638 was received from Canada in the form of a transfer of funds from a previous trust fund dedicated to Libya. As at the cut-off date of this report, expenses in the amount of EUR 708,960 had been charged to the trust fund for activities related to the destruction of Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons. This figure represents a decrease from last month, due to liquidation of outstanding obligations.

16. The trust fund continues to be used to fund activities related to Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons. The OPCW has concluded an agreement with

UNOPS, utilising funding from Cyprus, Finland, and New Zealand for the destruction of the remaining tank at Ruwagha.

17. The Secretariat has hired an expert company to develop a programme of work and budget for the clean-up operations of the Ruwagha Tank Farm. The programme of work and budget will be presented to potential donors for their consideration. The Secretariat acknowledges the request by the Council at its Eighty-Third Session to obtain soil samples from the area surrounding decanted Category 2 chemical tanks (paragraph 6.12 of EC-83/5). No action will be taken until sufficient soil samples can be obtained.

18. The Director-General would once again like to express his appreciation to those States Parties that have already made or have committed to making voluntary contributions to the trust fund.

United Nations S/2017/608

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 July 2017
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 14 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 11-14 July 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) P. **Ilichev**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

17-12198 (E) 200717 210717

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Annex to the letter dated 14 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (11 July 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported three incidents of gunfire: two in Ladhiqiyah governorate and one in Hama governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported eight violations in the following governorates: six in Damascus, one in Homs and one in Hama.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out three humanitarian operations in Aleppo city, delivering 3.6 tons of food parcels and water to the local population.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 410 people.

In total, 1,466 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 321 people.

Two United Nations humanitarian operations were carried out:

The Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr;

Eighteen truckloads of humanitarian cargo were delivered to Tafas in Dar'a governorate.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, 10 ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas in Homs governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process stands at 2,011.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (12 July 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported one incident of gunfire in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported 10 violations in the following governorates: 4 in Damascus, 4 in Dar'a, 1 in Idlib and 1 in Suwayda'.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out six humanitarian operations in Aleppo city and one humanitarian operation in Jiblaya in Homs governorate, delivering 4.96 tons of food parcels to the local population.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 1,558 people.

In total, 1,473 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 311 people.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 2,011.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (13 July 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: three in Ladhiqiyah, two in Damascus and one in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has reported five violations in the following governorates: three in Damascus, one in Hama and one in Homs.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out three humanitarian operations in Aleppo city, delivering 3.6 tons of drinking water to the local population.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 1,130 people.

In total, 1,476 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 207 people.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 2,011.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (14 July 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported 12 incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: 9 in Ladhiqiyah, 2 in Aleppo and 1 in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has reported 11 violations: 8 in Damascus governorate and 3 in Dar'a governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out seven humanitarian operations:

Six operations in Aleppo city, during which 7.1 tons of food parcels were delivered to the local population;

One operation in Homs governorate, during which 1.7 tons of food parcels were delivered to the local population.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo was 4.8 tons.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 1,510 people.

In total, 1,483 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 423 people.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out:

The Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process stands at 2,011.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.

United Nations S/2017/609

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 July 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 14 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Namibia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 14 July 2017 from the Secretary-General of the Frente Polisario, Brahim Ghali, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Neville **Gertze**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-12082 (E) 200717

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Annex to the letter dated 14 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Namibia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I would like to draw your attention to a serious development relating to the question of Western Sahara that may have adverse consequences for the ongoing United Nations peace process therein and challenge its responsibility regarding the protection of the territorial integrity of this Non-Self-Governing Territory.

On 6 July 2017, the Government of Morocco adopted a bill on delimiting the Moroccan exclusive economic zone, including the waters off Western Sahara, with a view to "cementing" Morocco's illegal occupation and annexation of the Territory.

The Frente Polisario considers this bill null and void as it constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and the status of Western Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory on the United Nations agenda since 1963. It also represents a blatant disregard for the ruling of the International Court of Justice of 1975 and the judgment of the European Court of Justice of 2016, which reaffirm that Morocco has no sovereignty over Western Sahara, which enjoys, by virtue of the principle of self-determination, a status separate and distinct from that of any other State, including Morocco.

Throughout its occupation of parts of Western Sahara, Morocco had never made an express claim to maritime zones adjacent to the coast of the Territory as it knows very well that such a declaration would be devoid of any legal value under international law. However, Morocco has always sought control over those areas by entering into commercial arrangements with foreign interests for the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources therein. Such arrangements include fisheries licences pursuant to the 2007 Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco, and reconnaissance and exploration licences in respect of Western Sahara's seabed petroleum resources.

The proposed bill is therefore a clear attempt by Morocco to consolidate its illegal annexation of Western Sahara. Moreover, if adopted, the bill will constitute a serious violation of the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people and all its components, including the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources. It will also be a violation of other peremptory norms of international law, including the inadmissibility of acquiring territories by force. Moreover, Morocco gave an implicit assurance, by accepting the United Nations-sponsored ceasefire and the referendum agreement, that the territorial status of Western Sahara was to remain unchanged pending self-determination. Therefore, without a substantial consultation with and the expressed consent of the Sahrawi people and their internationally-recognized representative, Frente Polisario, Morocco has no competence under international law to declare or establish, by litigation or negotiation with adjacent States, maritime boundaries for Western Sahara.

As you may be aware, on 21 January 2009, the Government of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) declared an exclusive economic zone, making official the exclusive rights of the Sahrawi people to the living and non-living resources (including oil, gas and fisheries) within 200 nautical miles offshore of the internationally recognized territory of Western Sahara, as provided for under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The declaration of Sahrawi maritime zones, which defines a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea and a 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone for SADR, was a further step aimed at preserving and taking control of the Sahrawi natural riches, which have been plundered illegally for many years by Morocco and other foreign interests. In

his report of 13 April 2009 on Western Sahara (S/2009/200), the Secretary-General of the United Nations referred to the declaration of Sahrawi maritime zones and to the fact that "the declaration was based on the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and to permanent sovereignty over their natural resources" (para. 4).

Therefore, due to the imperative nature of the international standards involved, all States and international organizations, including the United Nations, have an obligation under international law not to recognize, either de jure or de facto, the exclusive economic zone proposed by Morocco insofar as it includes the territorial waters of Western Sahara.

In view of the above, I would like to call on you to use your authority as Secretary-General to protect the territorial integrity of the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Western Sahara, including its territorial waters, in the face of Morocco's proposed move that will only further complicate the situation on the ground. It will also hinder the relaunching of the negotiating process with a new dynamic and a new spirit between the two parties, Morocco and the Frente Polisario, as recently called for by the Security Council.

In this regard, I would like to reiterate to you the readiness of the Frente Polisario to engage in serious negotiations with Morocco, under the auspices of the United Nations, with a view to achieving a peaceful and lasting solution that will provide for the inalienable right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination.

(*Signed*) Brahim **Ghali**
Secretary-General of the Frente Polisario

United Nations A/71/985–S/2017/610

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
17 July 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 61
Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 14 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith an answer given by a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), which was given to the question raised by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on 14 July 2017 with regard to attempts of the United States to fabricate another "sanctions resolution" against the DPRK (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ja** Song Nam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-12059 (E) 200717

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 14 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Answer given by a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 14 July 2017 with regard to the fact that the United States is attempting to rig up another "sanctions resolution" against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, branding its successful test-fire of the intercontinental ballistic missile as a "global threat"

The U.S., flabbergasted at the DPRK's success in the test-fire of the intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14, is making frenzied moves at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to fabricate another "resolution on sanctions" tougher than ever against the DPRK.

Right after the emergency meeting of the UNSC, the U.S. began letting out a stream of invectives every day against the DPRK's test-fire while making frantic efforts together with its vassal forces to produce a "press statement" in order to create the atmosphere of sanctions against the DPRK. At the same time, the U.S. is causing a lot of racket circulating the draft of a new "resolution on sanctions" at the UNSC and prattling that it would to put it to the "vote" without any compromise.

The racket of anti-DPRK "sanctions resolutions" being made by the U.S. is the manifestation of the heinous intention to evade the responsibility for having driven the DPRK to bolster its nuclear force by pursuing the policy of extreme hostility and nuclear threat against the latter and obliterate its sovereignty and right to existence.

The DPRK's test-fire of the intercontinental ballistic rocket is an exercise of its legitimate right to self-defence to thoroughly eradicate the over half a century long nuclear threat from the U.S. against the DPRK and reliably defend peace and stability of the Korean peninsula and the region at large.

The resounding success of the test-fire of the intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 has fully demonstrated the will and capability of the DPRK to annihilate the U.S. by a single blow to the very heart of its mainland in case it fails to act with discretion.

It is time for the U.S. to renew its perspective on the DPRK's strategic position, which has reached the dazzling heights, and to act with prudence. However, it is inviting its ultimate doom by resorting to the sanctions and pressure campaign against the DPRK.

It will be a fatal mistake to consider any chance that the DPRK, which rose to a dignified nuclear power and an ICBM state, would tolerate the reckless "sanctions" racket of the U.S. and other hostile forces.

Should the UNSC adopt another "resolution on sanctions", this will trigger corresponding measures by the DPRK and respond to the "resolution" with its act of justice.